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Unlabeled Drug Samples and the Learned Intermediary:
The Case for Drug Company Liability without Preemption
SUSAN POSER *

1. INTRODUCTION
In June 1992, shortly after giving birth, Michele Vitanza visited her physician
for a routine post-partum examination.! She complained of a stiff neck and the
physician gave her sorne samples of the prescription drug Ansaid, a nonsteroidal
anti-inflammatory drug. 2 The samples had been provided to the doctor earlier that
year by a drug representative from the Upjohn Company.3 The samples were given
to Mrs. Vitanza's physician in a box that contained nine blister cards,4 each containing four pills, and one Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved physician
package insert describing the drug, 5 contraindications, warnings, drug interactions,
adverse reactions, etc. Mrs. Vitanza took enough of the pills to relieve her symptoms
and put the rest in her medicine cabinet. 6 More than two years later, Mrs. Vitanza's
husband had a stiff neck and, remembering that his wife had received medicine
for the same symptoms, looked for and found the Ansaid tablets in the medicine
cabinet. 7 Mr. Vitanza had been warned by his own physician that he was severely
allergie to nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs and should not take them. 8 The
Ansaid blister card contained no warnings of this well-known allergy.9 The only
information on the blister card was the following:
Complimentary Package
Not for Sale
4 Tablets Ansaid 100 mg. Tablets
FLURBIPROFEN
Each tablet contains flurbiprofen 100 mg.
Information for use and dosage-see insert.
Store at controlled room temperature 15°_30° C (59°-86° F)
Caution: Federallaw prohibits dispensing without prescription. 10

• Ms. Poser is an Associate Professor, University of Nebraska College of Law. The author is
grateful to Greg Mitchell, College of Law Class of 2008, for his outstanding research assistance, and
Steve Willborn, Robert Schopp, and participants of the University of Nebraska College of Law Faculty
Colloquium for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. A University of Nebraska College of Law
McCollum Summer Research Grant helped support the research and writing of this article.
1
Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 214 F.3d 73, 75 (2d. Ciro 2000). Ail of the facts of this case that follow
are taken from this opinion.
2
1
4

Id.
Id.
Id. For pharmaceutical purposes, a blister card is a card that is attached to clear plastic bubbles

inside of which are individual pills.
5
Id. For a description of different kinds of FDA approved package inserts for prescription drugs,
see infra notes 224-239 and accompanying text.
6
Vitanza, 214 F.3d at 75.
7

S

9
10

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Although the blister pack said "see insert," there was no package insert provided
to Mrs. Vitanza when she received the samples. 11 Because of his known allergy, Mr.
Vitanza consulted two medical references, neither of which listed Ansaid as a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug. 12 He proceeded to take one Ansaid pil!. Within
two hours he was dead due to "a severe anaphylactic reaction to Ansaid."13
Michele Vitanza sued Upjohn Company for the wrongful death of her husband,
claiming that Upjohn failed to warn about adverse reactions on its sample labels. 14
The case was dismissed on summary judgment on the basis of the learned intermediary rule. 15 The learned intermediary rule, which has been adopted in almost every
state,16 holds that the manufacturer of a prescription drug has a dutYto warn the
prescribing physician of the risks and benefits of the drug, and it is the physician
in turn who has the duty to warn the patient. 17 Based on this rule, the district court
held that Upjohn had no dutYto warn Mrs. Vitanza or her husband. 18 Mrs. Vitanza
appealed and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, on its own motion, certified to
the Connecticut Supreme Court the question of whether the learned intermediary
doctrine should apply in this situation. 19 That Court held that the doctrine did apply.
The Second Circuit then upheld the summary judgment in favor of Upjohn. 20
This article proposes that people who suffer injuries resulting from the absence
of warnings on samples of prescription drugs be permitted to sue drug manufacturers directly in tort, the learned intermediary rule notwithstanding. The article
will discuss the rationales for the learned intermediary doctrine in the context of
prescription drug samples and demonstrate that the doctrine should not apply to
sample prescription drugs. Research shows that in many instances, drug companies'
promotion, marketing and packaging of sampIe prescription drugs put patients at
risk. Tort law should require these companies to absorb that risk when it results
in foreseeable harm. Recognition of an exception to the learned intermediary rule
in that context would spread the risk of harm from unlabeled prescription drugs
between physicians and drug companies in a way that more accurately accounts
for their responsibility for that risk. In addition, this article will show that recent
pronouncements by FDA concerning the preemptive effect of its drug labeling
regulations should not affect this analysis.
It is hard to know how many people are harmed by sampIe prescription drug
medication each year. In 2006, the National Academies' Institute of Medicine
reported that medication errors injure 1.5 million people annually.21 The report
addressed labeling of prescription drugs and found that there has been a growing
unease among healthcare providers and others about the way free samples are
Il

12

Id.
Id. Michele Vitanza's attorney belies that this omission was because the medical reference

works were published one year before Ansaid became widely available. Telephone interview with with
Jonathan Levine, Esq., Partner, Silver, Golub & Teitell, Stamford Conn. (Oct.l9, 2006).
L1 Vitanza, 214 E3d at 75.
14 Id. at 74.
15 Id. at 75-76. The case was dismissed after being removed to the federal district court from
Connecticut state trial court. Id.
16 Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc. 153 S.W3d 758, 767 (Ky. 2005).
Il Id. at 762.
18 Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 48 ESupp.2d 124, 132 (D. Conn. 1999).
19 Vitanza, 214 F.3d at 79.
on Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 271 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2001).
21 Press Release, The National Academies: Institute of Medicine, Medication Errors Injure 1.5
Million People and Cost Billions of Dollars Annually; Report Offers Comprehensive Strategies for
Reducing Drug-Related Mistakes (July 20, 2006), available al http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID== 11623.
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distributed and the resulting lack of documentation of medication use, as weB as
the bypassing of drug-interaction checks and counseling that are integral parts of
the standard prescription process. 22
Most people who believe that they are harmed by their medical care do not
initiate a lawsuitY In the case of samples, this might be because the injury is not
serious enough, or because their health insurance covers treatment associated with
the harm. 24 Because of the widespread adherence of courts to the learned intermediary rule, most lawyers would probably not initiate a lawsuit against a drug
manufacturer based on failure to warn on a sample, particularly if the damages are
not high. Someone harmed by the absence of warnings on samples of prescription
drugs can sue his/her physician on an informed consent theory, but these cases are
notoriously difficult to prove. 25 They often come down to the physician's testimony
against the patient's in a context in which the physician has many advantages in
front of a jury. Once a patient admits that sorne communication was made, the
physician can blame the patient for failing to ask for more information or to reveal
her confusion. 26 The physician can also simply contradict the patient's memory of
their conversation. One might not contact a lawyer in a case like Vitanza because
most people know that they should not take someone else's prescription drugs.
Yet it is weil known in the medical community that sample prescription drugs are
routinely taken by people, inc1uding the physician's family and office staff, without
their own doctor's consent or even knowledge,27 and that these samples often "wind
up in medicine cabinets for future use."28 There is little doubt that a warning on the
Ansaid samples would have prevented Mr. Vitanza's death.
Although the medical community recognizes hazards involved in the promotion,
labeling and dispensing of sample prescription drugs,29 the legal cornmunity has
largely overlooked them, both in case law and the law reviews. The Vitanza court
dismissed the plaintiff's case before she had an opportunity to demonstrate why
the learned intermediary rule should not be applied in her case. Unlike other drugs,
both prescription and over-the-counter (OTC), samples are routinely distributed
to patients without the benefit of any written warnings from the drug company or
the pharmacy, and often by a physician who was the target of aggressive marketId.
See, e.g., David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Re[orm:
It's the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1090 (2006) (citing studies finding that as few as 10
percent of negligently injured patients bring lawsuits); Marilynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who
Sues Their Doctors? How Patients Handle Medical Grievances, 24 LAW & SOC'y REV. 105, 105 (1990)
("Because very few grievances are transformed into disputes, and few disputes find their way through
the thickets of diversion to become legally framed and resolved, the lawsuits in medical studies represent on the tip of the iceberg."); Randall R. Bovberg & Laurence R. Tancredi, Liability Re[orm Should
Make Patients Safèr.· "Avoidable Classes of Events" are a Key Improvement, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 478,
478 n.2 (2005).
24 Hyman & Silver, supra note 23, at 1114.
25 Nancy K. Kubasek, Legislative Approaches ta Reducing the Hegemony of the Priestly Model
of Medicine, 4 MICH.J. GENDER & LAW 375, 393-394 (1997).
26 Michael J. Farrell, Medical Malpractice: Claims Culprits, and Defènses, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
65,79 (1992).
27 Mary-Margaret Chren, M.D., Interactions between Physicians and Drug Company Representatives, 107 AM J. MED. 182,182 (1999); see also lia M. Harris, Closing the Door on Sample Closets, MINN.
MED., (Jan., 2001), at 21, 25 available at http://www.mmaonline.net/publications/MnMed2001/January/Harris.html. (reporting that 96% of physicians, residents, nurses, and office staff surveyed reported
taking samples that were not prescribed for them).
28 Ellen Relkin, Warnings in Pharmaceutical Cases: l~ the Learned Intermediary Obsolete in the
New Millennium?, SF28 ALI-ABA 227, 231 (2000).
29 See infra notes 182-188 and accompanying text.
22
2J
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ing by representatives of the drug company seeking to increase prescriptions of a
new and expensive drug. 30
Because there is no pharmacist involved in the transaction when a sample is dispensed by a physician, the patient often does not receive printed information about
the drug when it is dispensed, nor is she reminded of the seriousness of receiving a
prescription drug that a trip to the pharmacy and the receipt of the specially labeled
container imparts. 31 Nevertheless, pharmaceutical companies distribute millions of
sample prescription drugs to physicians every year, along with a sales pitch often
accompanied by gifts and free meals.
Part II of this article reviews the current state of the law for failure to warn
claims concerning prescription drugs. It addresses the ongoing debate about the
learned intermediary rule and its exceptions. Part III describes the promotion of
prescription drugs and the role of samples in drug marketing, including the effect
of marketing on prescribing patterns, patient safety and the price of prescription
drugs. Part IV demonstrates how that marketing justifies an exception to the
learned intermediary rule for warnings about sampie prescription drugs. Part V
addresses the potential doctrinal and prudential arguments against liability of
pharmaceutical companies for inadequate labeling on sample drugs, including the
role of federal preemption.

II. W ARNING DEFECTS AND

THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY RULE

Michele Vitanza lost her claim against Upjohn Co. because she directed her failure to warn claim against the drug manufacturer instead of her physician. Since the
dawn of modern products liability law in the 1960s, products that are not defectively
designed or manufactured can still be defective if they do not carry warnings about
risks inherent in their design or use. All manufacturers of products have a dutYto
warn consumers about the risks of their products.J2 The learned intermediary rule
is an exception to that general dutYinsofar as the manufacturer's duty to warn of
the risk of prescription drugs is satisfied when the manufacturer warns the physician who prescribes the drug, not the ultimate consumer.
The prescription drug exception to the dutYto warn the product user directly
can be traced back to the advent of prescription drugs. In 1938, FDA issued regulations that for the first time drew a distinction between drugs that consumers could
buy OTC, and drugs for which "ail representations or suggestions contained in the
labeling thereof with respect to the conditions for which such drug or device is to
be used appear only in such medical terms as are not likely to be understood by the
ordinary individual."33 Drugs in this latter category require a doctor's prescription
before obtaining them. 34 Prior to this regulatory distinction, all non-narcotic drugs
See infra Part III.
See, Michele L. Hornish, Just What the Doctor Ordered-Or Was It?: Missouri Pharmacists'
Duty of Care In The 21 st Century, 65 Mo. L. REY. 1075, 1076 (2000) (noting that "pharmacists are the
last chance that the system has to correct itself"). A similar problem cxists for prescription medication
sold oyer the internet. See general/y, Chester Chuang, Is There a Doctor in the House? Using Failure-toWarn Liability to Enhance the Safety of Online Prescribing, 75 N.YU. L. REY. 1452 (2000) (proposing
abolition of the learned intermediary rule for drugs sold oyer the internet).
32 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2, cmt. i (1998).
JJ Promulgation of Regulations Under the FDCA and Repeal of Certain Regulations Heretofore
Promulgated Thereunder, 3 Fed. Reg. 3161-2, 3168 (Dec. 28,1938).
J4 Charles 1. Walsh, Steyen R. Rowland, & Howard L. Dorfman, The Learned Intermediary
Doctrine: The Correct Prescriptionfor Drug Labeling, 48 RUTGERS L. REY. 821, 825, nA (1996).
JO

JI
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could be purchased without physician approva1. 35 These FDA regulations were
codified in 1951 by the Durham-Humphrey Amendment to the Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act (FDCA), which required manufacturers to warn consumers directly
about OTC drugs but exempted prescription drugs if a warning was given to the
physician. 36 Fifteen years later, in Sterling Drug v. Cornish,37 the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals articulated the learned intermediary rule in the context of a failure to
warn c1aim against the manufacturer of a prescription drug for arthritis: 38
[I]n this case we are dealing with a prescription drug rather than a normal
consumer item. In such a case the purchaser's doctor is a learned intermediary between the purchaser and the manufacturer. If the doctor is properly
warned of the possibility of a side effect in some patients, and is advised of
the symptoms normally accompanying the side effect, there is an excellent
chance that injury to the patient can be avoided. 39
Thus, the learned intermediary rule is a common law doctrine but it developed
logically out of the regulatory framework for prescription and OTC drugs.
Shortly before Sterling Drug, the American Law Institute (ALI) published its
Restatement (Second) of Torts, inc1uding its influential section 4ü2A, which subjected manufacturers and sellers of products to strict liability for products sold in
a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous."40 The comment to Section 4ü2A
made it c1ear that inadequate warnings could render a product defective: "In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be
required to give directions or warning, on the container, as to its use."41
It does not follow inexorably from the distinction between prescription and OTC
drugs that only the latter must contain warnings directed to consumers. It would
be equally logical to require consumer warnings on prescription drugs, if only for
the purpose of reinforcing physician warnings. FDA does in fact require patient
labeling for some prescription drugs, inc1uding oral contraceptives, intrauterine
devices (lUDs), and some asthma drugS. 42 FDA has proposed rules requiring conId. at 822.
Id. at 826; ct: FDA, FDA Backgrounder.· Milestones in Us. Food and Drug Law History (1999),
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/mileston.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2007) (describing important dates in the
history of FDA).
37 370 F.2d 82 (8th Ciro 1966).
3R Id. at 85. Sec also, Timothy S. Hall, Reimagining the Learned Intermediary Rule for the New
Pharmaceutica/ Marketplace, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 193, 195 (2004).
J9 Sterling Drug, 370 F.2d at 85.
40 Restatement (Second) Torts, § 402A (1965).
41
Restatement (Second) Torts § 402A, cmt. j (1965). Comment k to section 402A, specifically
addressed warnings in the context of drugs, recognizing that many drugs are "unavoidably unsafe,"
because they carry known risks, but that they can be made safe with the addition of warnings. The
comment states:
There are sorne products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable
of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the
field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies ....
Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use
of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which
they involve. Such a product, properly prepared and accompanied by proper directions and
warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other
drugs, vaccines and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except
to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician.
Restatement (Second) Torts § 402A, cmt. k (1965).
42 Walsh et al., supra note 34 at 823.
J5

J6
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sumer warnings on virtually aIl prescription drugs, but those rules have never been
implemented due to lobbying from the pharmaceutical industry.43
Courts and commentators have identified three essential justifications for the
learned intermediary doctrine. First, because aIl prescription drugs by definition
pose risks to sorne patients and can only be obtained through a healthcare professional, it is the patient's physician who is in the best position to evaluate those
risks and weigh them against the benefits to a particular patient. 44 This view of the
patient-physician relationship posits the patient in a relatively passive role, relying on
the expertise of the physician to evaluate and prescribe appropriate medication. 45 If
the physician is fully informed by the drug company about the risks, the physician
is in the best position to tailor instructions and warnings to particular patients:
li is for the prescribing physician to use his own independent medical
judgment, taking into account the data supplied to him from the drug
manufacturer, other medical literature, and any other source available to
him, and weighing that knowledge against the personal medical history
of his patient, whether to prescribe a given drug. 46

This rationale for the learned intermediary rule parallels the independent dutY
of informed consent owed by a physician to a patient. The standard of care for
informed consent in the vast majority of states is governed by professional practice
in the community or speciaIty.47 Patients can sue their physician for lack of informed
consent if the patient can show that other physicians would have revealed more or
different information, and that the patient would have declined to take the drug if
he/she had learned this extra information. 48
A second rationale for the learned intermediary rule is that drug manufacturers
"Iack effective means to communicate directly with each patient. "49 Drug interaction
risks and other side effects might be most efficiently communicated in technical
language, which the average patient would not necessarily be able to understand.
The physician as learned intermediary, having the "expertise necessary to understand the warning labels adequately,"50 translates this information into language
that the patient can understand. 51
43 See Prescription Drug Product Labeling; Medication Guide Requirements, 60 Fed. Reg. 44,182
(Aug. 24, 1995) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 208, 314, & 601); Catherine A. Paytash, Note, The
Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Patient Package Inserts: A Balanced Approach to Preventing DrugRelated Injury, 51 STAN. L. REY. 1343,1344 (1999); infra Part V.A.
44 See Larkin Y. Pfizer, 153 S.W.3d 758, 767 (Ky. 2004). See also James Barney, Dancing Towards
Disaster or the Race to Rationality: The Demise ol the Learned Intermediary Standard and the Pharmacists' DutY to Warn, 39 GONZ. L. REY. 399,404 (2004) ("other than trusting the doctar, the patient
is not exercising an indiyidual 'choice....). Hall, supra note 38 at 203 ("Training and experience allow
the physician to translate the technical details concerning the potential therapeutic benefits and known
risks of the drug into specifie recommendation and instructions for use by the indiyidual patient. ").
45 Richard C. Ausness, Will More Aggressive Marketing Practices Lead to Greater Tort liability
for Prescription Drug Manufacturers?, 37 W AKE FOREST L. REY. 97, 108 (2002); Walsh et al., supra note
34 at 844.
46 Leibowitz Y. Ortho Pharmaceutical Carp., 307 A.2d 449, 457 (Pa. Super. 1973). See also, Reyes
Y. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1275 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding defendant Wyeth Laboratories
liable far failing to warn plaintiffs of risks or adyising them to seek the opinion and care of a medical
professional).
47 DAYID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LiABIUTY LAW § 22.1 (2005)
4' OWEN, supra note 47 at § 22.1; Paytash, supra note 43 at 1346-1347.
49 Larkin, 153 S.W.3d at 764.
50 Hall Y. Sinn, Inc., 102 F. App'x 846, 849 (5th Ciro 2004).
SI See Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers: Assessing the Regulatory and Liability
Issues, 32 GA. L. REY. 141, 157-159 (1997) (explicating similar rationales for the learned intermediary
rule).
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Finally, courts have suggested that direct warnings from manufacturers to patients
would interfere with the physician-patient relationship.52 Being bombarded with all
of the possible risks of a drug might confuse patients, causing them to miscalculate
the risks and benefits of the drug in their case. 53 Others have argued that providing
separate warnings to the patient would interfere with the trust relationship between
patient and physician, by signaling to the patient that it might be wise to rely on
information from outside sources. 54
The learned intermediary rule has been adopted by 45 jurisdictions and operates essentially as an irrebuttable presumption in the vast majority of cases. 55 The
rule was created and continues to be justified by a vision of the physician-patient
relationship in which the physician makes a completely informed decision about
the appropriateness of a certain drug for a patient and the patient is reasonable in
relying solely on that physician's expertise in making this decision. Implicitly, the
rule suggests that it would be insulting to the physician and possibly dangerous for
a patient to acquire outside information about a prescription drug, even from the
manufacturer, in order to he more fully informed about the risks and benefits of
the drug. Aiso implicit is the idea that if the patient has questions about side effects
of the drug over the course of treatment, he/she can simply contact the physician
for a consultation and the drug manufacturer has no responsibility to provide an
alternative source of information.
Sorne courts have recognized exceptions to the learned intermediary rule in situations where they considered these implicit assumptions to be absent. One early
exception was for mass immunization programs in which patients were immunized
against disease without the benefit of a one-on-one consultation with a physician. 56
Because vaccine manufacturers know that "people line up like lemmings to receive a
polio shot or flu vaccination,"57 manufacturers, who often sponsored the immunization c1inics, were required to provide warnings directly to the consumers. Methods
of warning inc1ude advertising at the c1inic 58 or providing a clear informed consent
form that sets forth the known risks. 59 This exception to the learned intermediary
doctrine is not universally recognized, however, and a majority of courts still apply
the learned intermediary rule to mass immunization cases, provided that adequate
warnings are given to the purchaser of the vaccine. 60
" See, e.g., Larkin, 153 S.W3d at 764 (Kentucky Supreme Court worries that a rule requiring direct
warnings from manufacturers to patients would interfere with the physician-patient relationship).
53 See Timm v. UpJohn Co., 624 F.2d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 1980); Ausness, supra note 45 at 109.
54 Ausness, supra note 45 at 110 (citing Swayze v. McNeil Labs, Inc., 807 F.2d. 464, 471 (5th Cir.
1987); Dunkin v. Syntex Labs, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121,123 (WD. Tenn. 1977); West v. Searle & Co., 806
S.W.2d 608, 613 (Ark. 1991); Tracy v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 569 N.E.2d 875,879 (Ohio 1991». See
also, Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg, A Prescription/or Drug Liability and Regulation, 58 OKLA. L
REV. 135, 161 (2005) (stating that imposing a duty to warn patients directly would weaken the relationship between doctor and patient).
55 Hall, supra note 38 at 196; 2 James T. O'Reilly, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINITSRATION § 26.10 (2d
ed. 1993); See also Larkin, 153 S.W3d at 767 (listing 34 states that have explicitly adopted the rule; 2
that have implicitiy adopted it; and 9 federal courts that have interpreted state law so as to adopt it).
56 Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Ciro 1968) (applying Montana law), Reyes V. Wyeth
Labs., Inc., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974) (applying Texas law); Givens V. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341 (5th
Cir. 1977) (applying Florida law). See also, OWEN, supra note 47 at § 9.6.
57 OWEN, supra note 47 at § 9.6.
58 Davis, 399 F.2d at 131.
59 Petty V. United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1436 (8th Cir. 1984). The Childhood Vaccine Act, which
created a trust fund for people injured by vaccines and provided a no-fault method to receiving compensation, also limited the availability of tort remedies. See 42 U.S.c. § 300aa-Il (1995).
60 Larkin,153S.W.3dat765-766(citingPettyv. United States, 740F.2d 1428, 1440 (8th Cir.1984);
Givens, 556 F.2d at 1345-1346 (5th Cir.1977); Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1276-1277 (5th Cir.1974); Cunningham
V. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377, 1381 (Okla.1974); Davis, 399 F.2d at 131).
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Severaljurisdictions recognize other exceptions to the learned intermediary doctrine. In MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,61 the Massachusetts Supreme
Court held that the manufacturer of oral contraceptives had a duty to provide
adequate warnings directly to the patient. 62 The Court reasoned that because
patients participate in the decision to use contraceptives more than in decisions
about other prescription drugs, and because the physician generally prescribes
up to a year of the drug and does not closely follow the patient, despite the risks
involved in oral contraceptives, direct warnings to the patient were necessary.63 The
Court perceived that it was relatively easy for the manufacturer to articulate in lay
language the risks of oral contraceptives, particularly because it was required to
do so by FDA,64 and that women would be inclined to reference those warnings
if they had questions between office visits. 65 Using similar reasoning, the Eighth
Circuit, applying Arkansas law, declared an exception for IUDs,66 but other courts
have declined to follow these precedentsY
In Perez v. Wyeth Labs., 68 a groundbreaking decision in 1998, the New Jersey
Supreme Court carved out an exception to the learned intermediary rule for the contraceptive patch Norplant because of the manufacturer's direct-to-consumer (DTC)
advertising campaign. Noting that "[o]ur medical-legaljurisprudence is based on
images of healthcare that no longer exist,"69 the Perez court based its decision on
the reality of current medical practice in which patients must take an active part
in their healthcare because of the limitations on doctor-patient consultation time
imposed by managed-care organizations and the fact that studies have found that
the majority of doctors fail to provide information about the risks of prescription
drugs. 70 The court also noted that drug companies cannot claim that patients do not
take an active role in their healthcare decisions, or that manufacturers lack effective
means to communicate with patients, when those same companies concertedly and
effectively influence consumers directly through advertising. 71 The Perez court held
that the presumption that the learned intermediary rule applied to prescription
drugs could be rebutted when DTC advertising did not contain adequate warnings
475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985).
Id. at 70.
63 Id. But see, Walsh et al., supra note 34 at 863 ("Oral contraceptives are not obtained in significant1y different ways than other prescription drugs. ").
64 MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 69-70.
65 Id. at 69. See also, Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379 (E.D.Mich. 1985) (Like
MacDonald, Stephens involved contraceptives); cf Edwards v. Basel Pharmaceuticals, 933 P.2d 298
(Okl. 1997) (declining to extend simi1ar reasoning to a case involving nicotine patches). The MacDonald
court held that the manufacturer's compliance with FDA regulations that required certain warnings in
a package insert with oral contraceptives did not prevent the plaintiff from suing in tort for inadeq uate
warning when the insert did not specifically mention the risk of stroke. 475 N.E.2d at 71-72.
66 Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064,1070-1071 (8th Cir. 1989) (applying Arkansas law). IUDs
are not prescription drugs but medical devices availab1e only through a physician. Courts have extended
the learned intermediary rule to devices and now routinely apply the learned intermediary ru1e to such
devices. OWEN, supra note 47 at § 9.6.
6J See, e.g., Martin v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352, 356 (Ill. 1996) (noting that a
majority of courts app1y the learned intermediary rule to contraceptive cases); Paytash, supra note 43
at 1351; Walsh et al., supra note 34 at 862-863.
68 734 A.2d 1245 (N.l. 1998).
69 Id. at 1247. For a general discussion of this idea, see Francis B. Palumbo & C. Daniel Mullins,
The Development of Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising Regulation, 57 FOOD & DRUG
L.l. 423 (2002).
70 Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255.
71
Id. at 1256 (quoting Susan A. Casey, Comment, Laying an Old Doctrine to Rest: Challenging
the Wisdom of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 931, 956 (1993)).
61
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of the drug's risks. Apart from one recent decision by the Supreme Court of West
Virginia, courts addressing the effect of DTC advertising on the learned intermediary rule have declined to follow Perez. 72 In recent cases, the New Jersey courts
themseIves have created sorne limits to this exception, holding that merely placing
informational brochures in physicians' waiting rooms was not enough to invoke
the exception,73 and limiting causation to those cases where the plaintiff can show
that she actually saw and was affected by the advertising. 74
A growing body of scholarly work has questioned the appropriateness of the
learned intermediary rule in the context of modern medical practice and drug
marketing techniques. The common theme in most of this work is that the reality
of modern medicine makes the learned intermediary rule an anachronism that is
no longer justified and serves only to shield drug companies from liability while
saving them the cost of providing warning labels. These articles tend to focus on
the changes in the doctor-patient relationship and the pharmaceutical industry's
own interference with this relationship through mass media advertising as weIl as
the growing availability of prescription drugs on the internet. 75 Doctors now spend
less time with their patients because of the pressures from managed-care organizations, and they are often reacting to patient requests for prescription drugs, rather
than initiating a well-considered course of treatment. The treatment options are
further limited to those drugs preferred by patients' managed-care plans. 76 Because
of limitations imposed by managed-care organizations on patients' ability to choose
their physicians, patients are less likely to develop long-term reIationships with
their physicians. 77 At the least, as Timothy Hall argues, courts should undertake
a more fact-based analysis when the learned intermediary rule is invoked in order
to determine if the physician was actually functioning as a learned intermediary
in the transaction. 78
There are, however, many who continue to support the learned intermediary rule,
based on the classic rationales about the expertise of the physician and the difficulty
that drug companies would encounter in writing patient warnings about prescriptions drugs that are both useful and comprehensible to the average consumer. 79 The
learned intermediary rule is, for the most part, alive and weIl. In the vast number
of instances, patients who believe that they were not adequateIy warned about the
harm or side effects caused by their prescription drugs may only sue their physi72 The Supreme Court of West Virginia decided in June 2007 not to adopt the learned intermediary
rule in a prescription drug product liability case because it found the rationale for the rule "outdated
and unpersuasive," particularly in light of the pervasiveness of DTC advertising. State ex. rel. Johnson
and Johnson v. Karl, 647 S.E. 2d 899, 906 (WVa. 2007). For cases declining to follow Perez, see, e.g.,
In re Meridia Products Liability Litigation, 328 FSupp.2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2004); In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 215 FSupp.2d 795 (E.D. Tex. 2002).
73 Banner v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, 891 A.2d 1229, 1236 (N.l. Super. 2006).
74 Appleby v. Glaxo WeIlcome, Inc., No. Civ. 04-0062 (RBK), 2005 WL 3440440, at *5 (D.N.l. Dec.
13,2005). See also, John B. Reiss, Mark C. Levy & AIIison B. Newhart, Analyzing the Laws, Regulations,
and Policies Affecting FDA-Regulated Products, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.I 279,289-291 (2006) (suggesting
that a consumer must at least show that he or she saw and was influenced by the advertising).
75 See, e.g., Ausness, supra note 45 at 120-121; Hall, supra note 38 at 196-198 (caIIing for a complete overhaul of the learned intermediary mie in Iight of changes to the doctor-patient relationship
and pharmaceutical marketing).
76 Paytash, supra note 43 at 1358-1360.
7J See id.; Chester Chuang, Is There a Doctor in the House: Using Failure-to- Warn Liability to
Enhance the Safety of Online Prescribing, 75 NYU. L. Rev. 1452 (discussing stats on the changing
nature of the doctor-patient relationship).
78 Hall, supra note 38 at 239-244.
79 Schwartz et al., supra note 54 at 160; Barney, supra note 44 at 405.
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cians (and occasionally pharmacists 80) for failure to warn, a claim usually framed
as lack of informed consent. 81
In response to the recognized exceptions to the learned intermediary rule and
growing scholarly dissatisfaction with it, the recent Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability took a flexible approach to the rule. The Restatement endorsed
the learned intermediary rule, but recognized the possibility of exceptions in circumstances where the rationale for the rule was weak. Section 6 states:
(d) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to
inadequate instructions or warnings if reasonable instructions or warnings
regarding foreseeable risks of harm are not provided to:
(1) prescribing and other healthcare providers who are in a position to reduce

the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings; or
(2) the patient when the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that
healthcare providers will no! be in a position to reduce the risks of harm in
accordance with the instructions or warnings. 82

This Restatement justifies the basic doctrine under Section 6(d)(l) in the conventional way, stating: "Only healthcare professionals are in a position to understand
the significance of the risks involved and to assess the relative advantages and disadvantages of a given form of prescription-based therapy."83 Yet it also recognizes
that "in certain limited therapeutic relationships the physician or healthcare provider
has a much-diminished role as an evaluator or decision maker."84
Under Section 6(d)(l), if the manufacturer fails to warn the physician adequately,
the plaintiff has a claim against the manufacturer for failure to warn the physician. 85
Section 6(d)(2) envisions a category of exceptions when the duty to warn is owed
directly to the patient because physicians are not in the best position to provide a
warning to the patient. The Comments to Section 6(d)(2) recognize the exceptions
to the learned intermediary rule for vaccines, contraceptives and DTC advertising
and leave to case law whether others shouId be developed. 86
Despite the absence of evidence that the drafters of this section considered sample
prescription drugs, the way in which sampIes are marketed and dispensed makes
them particuIarly suitable for inclusion in the category of exceptions articulated by
Section 6(d)(2) of the Restatement. The Second Circuit Court of AppeaIs cited this
section in Vitanza when it certified to the Connecticut Supreme Court the question
of whether there should be an exception to the learned intermediary ruIe for harm
caused by unlabeIed samples. 87 The learned intermediary rule provides immunity
to drug companies as long as they provide written warnings to physicians in the
form of FDA-approved trade labeling in the sample package and patient warnings
in the official Physicians Desk Reference. 88
gO

RICHARD R. ABOOD & DAVID B. BRUSHWOOD, PHARMACY PRACTICE AND THE LAW 112 (3d ed.

2001).
OWEN, supra note 47 at § 22.10.
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 6(d) (2006) (emphasis added).
83 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 6 cmt. b (2006).
84 Id.
85 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, § 6, cmt. d ("[m]anufacturers of prescription
drugs discharge their duty of care ta patients by warning the healthcare providers who prescribe and
use the drugs ta treat them.").
86 Id., cmt. e.
87 Vitanza v. Upjohn, 214 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2000).
88 Ausness, supra note 45 at 100.
81

82
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The Iearned intermediary rule creates a situation in which drug companies have
no Iegai disincentive to overpromote to physicians. 89 Yet, drug companies have
reason to know that physicians "will not be in a position to reduce to the risks
of harm," from samples because the companies employ marketing techniques intended to minimize physicians' recognition of potentiai harm from their drugs and
to maximize distribution of the samples to patients. Moreover, the rationaies for
exceptions to the Iearned intermediary rule for contraceptives (such as the need to
have a reference at home), and advertising (such as drug company interference with
the doctor-patient relationship), are particularly apposite in the case of samples.
The applicability of these rationaies to prescription drug samples becomes apparent
when one examines the marketing practices of pharmaceuticai companies.
Permitting a cause of action against a drug company for inadequate Iabeling
on sample prescription drugs wouid not change the dutY of physicians to warn
patients and obtain their informed consent when the physician distributes those
samples. Physicians who are acting under a conflict of interest, or who shouid be
aware of their own bias, whether unconscious or not, shouid take responsibility for
it. 90 Rather, the justification for this proposaI is that Iegai responsibility for conduct
shouid be shared by physicians and drug companies in a way that accords with
cuipability and promotes public safety.91

III.

PRESCRIPTION DRUG MARKETING AND SAMPLES

The pharmaceuticai industry spends billions of dollars each year marketing
prescription drugs. Aithough most consumers are aware of DTC advertising on
television and in magazines,92 this is a far Iess significant feature of drug marketing than promotion to physicians. 93 The primary targets of the pharmaceuticai
industry's promotionai activities are the physicians who prescribe the drugs and, to
a Iesser extent, the healthcare organizations and pharmacy formularies that decide
which drugs to stock. The Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA)
recently reported that 90 percent of the pharmaceuticai industry's $21 billion annuaI
marketing budget was spent on direct marketing to physicians. 94 The New England
Journal of Medicine estimated that the drug industry spends annually between $8,000
and $15,000 per physician in the United States to market drugS. 95 Sometimes the
marketing budget for the drug exceeds the amount spent on developing the drug. 96
See infra notes 174-180 and accompanying text for discussion of overpromotion.
The medical profession itself, acknowledging the influence of drug promotion, recent1y called
for academic medical centers to provide leadership on conflicts of interest to which physicians are
subject. See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Health Industry Practices That Create Conflicts of Interest: A
Policy Proposal for Academie Medical Centers, 295 JAMA 429,431 (2006).
91 See generally, John c.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 521-529
(2003) (describing the ascendancy of compensation-deterrence theory in tort).
92 In 1997, FDA loosened its rules on DTC advertising and permitted television advertising of
prescription drugs. Palumbo & Mullins, supra note 69 at 427.
93 In 2001, the drug industry spent $2.24 billion on DTC advertising, as compared to $27.7 billion
on promotions to physicians. Palumbo & Mullins, supra note 69 at 431. See infra notes 113-115 and
accompanying text.
94 Brennan et al., supra note 90 at 430.
95 David Blumenthal, Doctors and Drug Companies, 351 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1885, 1885 (2004).
Blumenthal gives the example of Novartis, which reported spending 36 percent of its revenues on
marketing in 2001. Id. The average in the industry is 33 percent. Id
96 17 Am. Jur. Trials §5 (Supp. 2006) ("Studies of the introduction of almost any drug new to
the market reveal a budgeting of funds for its promotion that rivaIs or exceeds the budget for scientific
development of the drug."); JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES, THE BENEFITS, RISKS AND COSTS OF
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 305 (2004) (reporting that pharmaceutical companies employed 86,226 people in
marketing and 51,588 in research and development).
89

90
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This makes economic sense in light of one study that found that for each dollar
spent on "detailing" (i.e., promotion of the drug to physicians by representatives
from drug companies), the retum was $10.29. 97 This is more than seven times the
retum on DTC advertising. 98
Typically, direct marketing involves a pharmaceutical drug representative (drug
rep) visiting a physician, group practice or hospital, and providing small gifts such
as pens and paper, as weIl as meals, to everyone in the office and free samples to
the physicians, while at the same time promoting a particular prescription drug.
Sorne physicians' offices get lunch provided by drug reps every day.99 Other gifts
to physicians include free continuing medical education, payment for travel and
registration at meetings, and consulting fees. loo These contacts begin early in physicians' careers when they are medical students and residents and continue from
there. lOI One study found that practicing physicians meet with drug reps on average
four times per month. 102
There are approximately 90,000 drug reps in the United States, approximately 1
drug rep for every 4.7 office-based physicians, 103 and they have becorne increasingly
sophisticated in their marketing techniques. Drug reps are salespeople whose compensation is directly linked to increases in the number of prescriptions written by
their targeted physicians. 104 Drug companies recruit the most attractive and perky
people they can find right out of college to be drug reps. Sorne companies have found
that cheerleaders make the best pharmaceutical sales reps and they have begun to
develop relationships with cheerleading coaches to help their recruiting. 105 One coach
said of the recruiters, "They don't ask what the major is .... Exaggerated motions,
exaggerated smiles, exaggerated enthusiasm-they leam those things, and they can
get people to do what they want."106 As one joumalist recently observed:
Drug reps today are often young, weIl groomed and strikingly goodlooking. Many are women. They are usually affable and sometimes very
smart. Many give off a kind of glow, as if they had just emerged from a
spa or salon. And they are always, hands down, the best-dressed people
in the hospital.10 7
Carl Elliot. The Drug Pushers, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, (Apr. 2006), at 82,83.
Id.
99 Stephanie Saul, Drug Makers Pay for Lunch as They Pitch, N.Y TIMES, (July 28,2006) at Al.
100 Brennan et al., supra note 90 at 430.
101 Blumenthal, supra note 94 at 1886 (citing surveys reporting that medical residents receive an
average of six gifts from pharmaceutical companies per year, including free samples, money for travel
to meetings, and free lunches); MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES 127 (2005)
("This 'food, flattery, and friendship,' as it has been called, creates a sense of reciprocity in young doctors with long prescribing lives ahead of them. They naturally feel indebted to congenial people who
keep giving them gifts.").
102 Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gifi Ever Just a Gift? 283 lAMA
373,374 (2000). A more recent study based on a national survey of 3167 physicians and published in
2007, found that 94 percent of physicians have sorne type of relationship with drug companies, 83 percent
receive free food or beverages, and 78 percent of physicians receive free drug samples. Eric Campbell, et.
al., A National Survey of Physician-Industry Relationships, 356 NEW ENG. 1. MED. 1742-1750 (2007).
103 Blumenthal, supra note 94 at 1886.
104 Frank C. Woodside & Margaret M. Maggio, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: Is It Eroding?,
FED. LAW., (Dec. 2005), at 28,31; AvoRN, supra note 96 at 303 (reporting that bonuses alone can be up
to $50,000 per year for the drug rep who "moves enough product").
105 Stephanie Saul, Gimme an Rx! Cheerleaders Pep Up Drug Sales, N.Y TIMES, (Nov. 28, 2005) at AI.
106 Id.
107 Elliot, supra note 97 at 82. Drug representatives used to be called "detail men," a reference to "detailing" which meant providing doctors with information about the company's drugs. See id.; Woodside & Maggio,
supra note 104 at 31. Given the current demographics of the profession, drug rep seems more accurate.
97

9H

Poser in Food and Drug Law Journal (2007) 62(4).
Copyright 2007, Food and Drug Law Institute. Used by permission.

2007

UNLABELED DRUG SAMPLES AND THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY

665

The job of the drug rep is to convince doctors that they should prescribe their
company's drug. Seduction is "deliberate industry strategy,"108 the success of which
is measured by increases in the number of prescriptions written for whatever drug
is being promoted. IÜ9 The New York Times reported in 2006:
A former pharmaceutical representative, Kathleen Slattery-Moschkau,
called lunch "incredibly effective" in lifting pharmaceutical sales for
the companies where she worked, Bristol-Myers Squibb and Johnson &
Johnson. "We got the numbers of what the physicians were prescribing. If
1 brought in lunch one week, 1 could see the following week if that lunch
had an impact," Ms. Slattery-Moschkau said. llÜ
ln addition to lunch, drug reps make their case through interpersonal appeals
and gifts, inc1uding the gift of prescription drug samples. One physician and Fellow
of the American College of Physicians noted:
1 have watched reps "rearrange" our drug sample cabinet, placing their
wares in front while relocating the competition out of sight~and hopefully out of mind. Drug-Iabeled pens, pads, coffee mugs, calendars, letter
openers and penlights are standard issue in most of our offices. As a
gastroenterologist, 1 expect to discover any day that our toilet paper has
been embossed with a drug company's logo. III
Marketing also takes place at the organizationalleve1. Pharmaceutical companies often provide continuing medical education to physicians, and sponsor annuaI
meetings of physician specialists. ll2 Sorne companies offer discounted prices to
managed-care organizations for their drugs if those organizations agree to give
their drugs "favorable treatment" in their formularies. l13
Recent scandaIs have resulted in drug companies cutting down or eliminating
their more extravagant gifts, like free trips to resorts for "educational conferences. "114
One scandaI involved drug companies inducing physicians to switch patients to their
drugs by providing drugs cheaply so that the physicians could charge Medicare the
market price, and pocket the difference. lI5 In another, a company paid physicians
$1,000 for each new prescription of its drug. 116
Elliot, supra note at 97.
See also, Melody Peterson, Suit Says Company Promoted Drug in Exam Rooms, N.Y. TIMES,
(May 15,2002) at Cl. (reporting on unsealed court documents showing that drug representatives persuaded doctors to allow them into the examining rooms to speak with patients.).
llll Saul, Drug Makers Pay for Lunch as They Pitch, supra note 99.
III Michael Kirsch, Is There an Ethical Doctor in the House?, ACP OBSERVER, (Oct. 1997), http://
www.acponline.org/journals/news/oct97/ethicdr.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
112 Blumenthal, supra note 94 at 1886
1Il8
1Il9

111

Id.

Saul, Drug Makers Pay for Lunch as They Pitch, supra note 99.
One of these cases settled for $875 million. Daniel Higgins, What Providers Need to Know about
the New OIG Guidelines on Pharmaceutical Marketing, THE HEALTH LAWYER, (Dec. 2002) at l, 1; David
L. Douglass & Olabisi A. Onisile, Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices: Providcrs Beware, THE HEALTH
LAWYER, (Aug. 2004) at 31, 34 (reporting on the Lupron investigations in 2003); ANGELL, supra note
101 at 130-132 (same).
116 Douglass & Onisile, supra note 115 at 34. (discussing Biovail). Daniel Higgins describes "switching arrangements" in which drug companies provide incentives for physicians or formularies to switch
the prescriptions drugs that they prescribe or oller. The lnspector General found these practices to be
'''suspect undcr the anti-kickback statute.'" Higgins, supra note 115 at 5.
114
115
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In 2002, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) issued its first ever "draft guidance" to the pharmaceutical
industry signaling that the many of these gifts might violate federal fraud and kickback
statutes. 117 In anticipation of the OIG's guidelines, the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), the trade association for the pharmaceutical industry, issued its own Code on Interactions with Healthcare Professionals. ll8
This Code reaffirmed the premise for drug detailing, stating in its Preamble that its
mission is to help patients, and that implementing that mission requires "ensuring
that healthcare professionals have the latest, most accurate information available
regarding prescription medicines."119 The code permits modest "occasional meals"
in connection with the provision of information about drugs and gifts that benefit
patients, including samples, as weIl as smaller items such as pens and notepads with
the company's logo, if they are valued at less than $100. 120 The samples, however, only
trigger the $100 limit if they have monetary value to the physician, which would not
be the case if the physician provides the samples to patients for free. 121 Thus, even
with the new guidelines, drug reps are not limited in the number of samples that
they can distribute to physicians. As some have observed, this Code only elevated
the importance of getting the most return out of smaller giftS. 122
The PhRMA Code ties the provision of free meals to its mission of "ensuring
that healthcare professionals have the latest, most accurate information available
regarding prescription medicines."123 Yet drug reps are not experts in pharmacology and often provide information to physicians that "does not educate at aIl: it is
often inaccurate and clearly intended to promote rather than educate."124 A study
published in lA MA found that that Il percent of statements made by pharmaceutical representatives about drugs were inaccurate and the inaccuracies were generally
not recognized by physicians l25 As one observer stated:
The average juror ... would be astounded if he were to examine the volume
of drug information which manufacturers unleash upon the physician.
117 Diane Ung & Lena Robins, DHHS Tai/ors Compliance Program Guidelinefor Pharmaceutieal
Manufaeturers, DRUG BENEFIT TRENDS, (N ov. 2002), at 34, 35; Higgins, supra note 115 at 1; Editorial,
Drugmakers' Gifis ta Doctors Final/y Get Needed Scrutiny, USA TODAY, (Oct. 14,2002), at A14.
118 PhRMA, PhRMA-Principles and Guidelines. http://www.phrma.orglprinciples_and-lluidelines/
(last visited Feb. 9, 2007); Jason Dana & George Lowenstein, A Social Science Perspective on Gifis ta
Physicians From Industry, 290 JAMA 252, 252 (2003); David M. Studdert, Michelle M. Mello, & Troyen
A. Brennan, Financial Conflicts al Interest in Physicians' Relationships with the Pharmaceutical Industry-SelFRegulation in the Shadow al Federal Prosecution, 351 NEw ENG. 1. MED. 1891, 1891 (2004).
119 PhRMA, PhRMA-Principles and Guidelines, http://www.phrma.org/principles_and-lluidelines/
(last visited Feb. 9, 2007).
120 Dana Katz, Arthur L. Capian & Jon F. Merz, Al/ Gifis Large and Smal/: Toward an Understanding
of the Ethics al Pharmaceutical Industry Gift-Giving, 3 AM. 1. OF BIOETIlICS 39, 40 (2003). Interestingly,
the Code appears to be intentionally ambiguous about prohibiting conduct. Ils language is written in
terms of items that "may" be offered and items that "should not" be offered. This contrast with other
ethics codes that articulate prohibited conduct with the terms "may not" or "must not."
121 See Ung & Robins, supra note 117 at 35.
'" Saul, Drug Makers Pay for Lunch as They Pitch, supra note 99 ("Doing business over lunch is
a common practice in many fields, but drug makers have honed it to perfection.").
123 PhRMA, PhRMA-Principles and Guidelines, http://www.phrma.orglprinciples_and-lluidelines/
(last visited Feb. 9, 2007).
124 Chren, supra note 27 at 182 (citing various studies). Cf, Chew et al., A Physician Survey al the
Effect of Drug Sample Availahility on Physicians' Behavior, 151. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 478, 482 (2000)
(85 percent of responding physicians agreed that drug samples deprive patients of important counseling
and drug interaction screening by pharmacists).
125 M.G. Ziegler, P. Lew & Re. Singer, The Accuracy al Drug Information From Pharmaceutical
Sales Representatives, 273 JAMA 1296, 1296 (1995).
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Manufacturers want to push waves of information at the physician with
the clear expectation that the physician cannot, and will not, absorb all
of it. Furthermore, the size of the type-face of the product information is
purposely small. Also, an advertising agency will emphasize the beneficial
uses, rather than the side effects, adverse reactions and contraindications.
The manufacturer's motive, however, is not deception but profit. 126
Also in response to the üIG's proposed guidelines, the American Medical Association (AMA), the American College of Physicians, and the Accreditation Council
for Continuing Medical Education (ACCME) issued new or revised guidelines. 127
These guidelines limit gifts from pharmaceutical companies to small gifts that are
intended for office use, education or patient care. 128 They permit sample distribution, in sorne cases even approving of their use by physicians and their families,
despite awareness of the dangers of sample prescription drugs, particularly to
non-patients like Mr. Vitanza. 129
Samples are the lynchpin of prescription drug marketing. 130 In 2000, drug
companies spent almost $4 billion on samples alone, and in 1999 they distributed
(through their representatives) 766 million samples, which averages to 1,500 samples
for every physician in the United States. 131 In 2004, drug companies spent $27.7
billion on promotion, of which $15.9 billion was spent on free drug samples and
$7.3 billion on small gifts such as notepads, pens and lunches for physicians and
office staff.132 A survey of physicians across the United States in 2001 found that
92 percent had accepted free samples from drug companies. 133
For a variety of reasons, free samples are an extremely effective marketing strategy for increasing the sale of prescription drugs. First, the sampIe is a gift to the
doctor, which consciously or unconsciously triggers in many physicians a sense of
gratitude and obligation. 134 When drug reps pitch a prescription drug to a physician
they can give the physician a sample at the same time, thereby encouraging and
permitting the physician to put this new knowledge into action immediately. Second,
samples are most frequently distributed for the newest and most expensive drugs.
Providing a sample allows the physician in turn to be the giver of a valuable gift
to patients. 135 Sorne doctors say that giving away free samples helps them to bond
with their patients. 136 Third, and most important, if the sample works for a patient,
Farrell, supra note 26 at 60.
Studdert et al., supra note 119 at 1894--1897. The other organizations issuing similar new or
revised guidelines were ACCME and the American College of Physicians.
12X Id.
129 Id. at 1897. When physicians and their staffs use the drug samples they are then receiving a
gift of value that should raise ethical issues about conflicts of interest. The AMA Code circumvents
this issue by permitting such use if it is on a short-term or trial basis. See LEONARD 1. WEBER, PROFITS
BEFORE PEOPLE? ETHICAL STANDARDS AND THE MARKETING OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 89 (2006)
Illl ANGELL, supra note lOI at 129 ("Free samples are the most important gifts."); WEBER, supra
note 130 at 90 ("Drug samples are the most important gifts provided to physicians by pharmaceutical
company sales reps not only because of their large dollar value, but also because the samples are likely
to have a significant impact on the practice of medicine.").
III Harris. supra note 27.
1J2 Karen Springen. Saying No to Big Pharma, NEWSWEEK. (Oct. 5,2006), http://www.msnbc.msn.
com/id/ 15143275/si te/newsweek/print/ 1/displaymode/l 098.
131 Blumenthal. supra note 94 at 1886.
134 See in/ra notes 153-169.
Ils Elisabeth L. Backer et al., The Value of Pharmaceutical Representative Visits and Medication
Samples in Community-Based Family Practices, 49 1. OF FAM. PRAC. 811. 814 (2000).
Il6 Harris, supra note 27.
126
127
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or is perceived to work, that patient is more likely to request the full prescription
of that particular drug (as opposed to a generic or a different drug) and the physician is more likely to prescribe that drug. 137 Coupling free sample distribution with
free lunches and sorne notepads and pens to reinforce brand recognition creates a
strong inducement to prescribe particular drugS. 138
Anecdote, and now many studies, have verified the effectiveness of drug promotion tied to sample distribution. Pharmaceutical companies collect data on the
prescribing practices of physicians, so drug reps are able to track the success of
their promotions. 139 They know which doctors are "early prescribers" (known as
"cowboys" among drug reps)14ü who tend to prescribe new drugs soon after they
are released. Drug reps visit these doctors early and often. 141
Numerous studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of distributing samples
and other gifts for increasing the volume of prescriptions. One researcher, after
reviewing 29 studies on the effects of contact between drug reps and physicians
concluded that these interactions affect prescribing behavior. 142 This researcher
found that "[a]ccepting samples was associated with awareness, preference and
rapid prescription of a new drug, and a positive attitude toward the pharmaceutical
representative."143 This finding has been confirmed by others. 144 One study looked
at internaI medicine residents' attitudes toward samples and found that access to
samples affected their prescribing behavior by making them more likely to prescribe
those drugs and less likely to recommend OTC medication than residents without
such access. 145 As one writer observed, "[A]t the critical moment-the 'point-ofdecision,' to quote the marketers' jargon-the drug is there, and it's free."146 Another study found that physicians who met with representatives of pharmaceutical
companies were five times more likely than other physicians to request that drugs
made by those companies be added to a hospital formulary.147
As with many instances of conflict of interest, the bias created in physicians by
pharmaceutical promotions tends to be unintentional and unconscious. 148 When
asked in general terms, physicians deny that gifts from drug reps affect their preIJl Jennifer Fisher Wilson, Prescribing Under Pressure, ACP OBSERVER, (Oct. 1997), http://www.
acponline.org/journals/news/oct97/pressure.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2007); Michelle Meadows, Saving
Money on Prescription Drugs, FDA CONSUMER MAGAZINE. (Sept. 2005), at 18, {lVailabie at http://www.
fda.gov/fdac/featuresI2005/505_save.html (info on priee of generics vs. name brand drugs).
lJS Farrell, supra note 26 at 72.
139 Stephanie Saul, Doctors Object as Drug Makers Learn Who's Prescribing What. N.Y. TIMES,
(May 4, 2006), at Al.
140 17 Am. lur. Trials § 5 (Cumm. Supp. 2006); Dana & Lowenstein, supra note 118 at 252. The
data on prescribing practiees provided by the pharmacies is paid for by market research firms who then
sell it to drug companies. AVORN, supra note 96 at 294.
141 Id.
147 Wazana, supra note 102 at 375-376. See also, Phyllis Magllire, No Easy Answers When Managing Financia/ Conjlicts, ACP OBSERVER, (June 2005), http://www.acponline.org/shell-cgi/printhappy.
pl/journals/news/jun05/finanee.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
14) Id.
144 See, e.g., Brennan et al., supra note 90 at 431 ("The rate of drug prescriptions by physicians
increases substantially after they see sales representatives, attend company-supported symposia, or
aceept samples." (footnotes omilted»; Harris, supra note 27. (citing numerous studies); Chren, supra
note 27 at 1893 (same).
145 Laurie Barclay, Access to Drug Samples May Influence Resident Physician Prescribing, 118 AM.
1. Mw. 881, 882 (2005).
146 WEBER, supra note 129 at 85-86 (qlloting KATHERINE GREIDER, THE BIG FIX: How THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY RIPS OFF AMERICAN CONSUMERS 76 (2003».
l4l Bob Goodman, Do Drug Company Promotions Influence Physician Behavior? 174 WEST. 1. Mw.
232 (2001).
l4X Dana & Loewenstein supra note 118 at 254. Susan L. Coyle, Physician-Industry Relations. Part
1: Individual Physicians, 136 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 396, 397 (2002) (citing studies). See also, MICHAEL
S. PRITCHARD, PROFESSIONAL INTEGRITY: THINKING ETHICALLY, 60-66 (2006).
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scribing practices, 149 while also tending to believe that accepting gifts might affect
their colleagues' decisionmaking. 150 Physicians are particularly adamant that small
gifts, like samples and office trinkets, are harmless,151 and that accepting them is
not ethically problematic. 152 Yet, studies have found that small gifts can be just as
effective as large ones in creating a sense of obligation in the recipient. 153
Social science research reveals an interesting paradox in physicians' attitude
toward samples. When asked specifically about samples, residents and physicians
acknowledge that samples influence their prescribing patterns. For example, in one
survey of residents and faculty at an academic medical institution, respondents
indicated that drug samples did influence their choice of drugs for patients. 154
In another survey, researchers found that over 90 percent of physicians whose
practices used samples said they would dispense a sampIe that was not their first
choice of drug if they had that drug in their sampIe closet.1 55 Another study found
that 55 percent of surveyed family medicine residents believed that their access to
samples influenced their prescribing behavior. 156 In Wazana's review of 29 empirical studies of interactions between physicians and drug reps, she concluded that
interactions with drug reps "affect prescribing and professional behavior."157 On
the other hand, most physicians do not consider themselves biased and when asked
whether promotional material from drug reps influences their practice, 61 percent
answered in the negative. 158
Thus, physicians, when asked direct1y, admit that having samples on hand affects
their prescribing habits, but at the same time they do not think that drug company
promotions make them biased, even though most of them also think that such promotions do influence other physicians' practice. These findings must be reconciled
with the many studies that find that drug promotions do in fact affect prescribing
practices. 159 Reconciling them is easier if the bias created by drug promotions is
unconscious-recognizable in others but not in oneself. 160
Dana and Loewenstein have shown that physicians' unconscious response to drug
company promotions is exactly what the literature on conflict of interest would
predict. That literature reveals that when people have to choose among a set of
arguably fair or reasonable options, they tend to choose the one that favors their
own interests, even if they are aware of the bias. 161 In fact, studies have found that
the more gifts a physician accepts, the less likely the physician is to believe that he
or she is affected. 162 Dana and Lowenstein conclude:
Dana & Loewenstein, supra note 118 at 253-254.
Id. at 254.
151 Allan S. Brett, Wayne Burr & Jamaluddin Moloo, Are Gifts From Pharmaceutical Companies
Ethically Problematic? A Survey of Physicians, 163 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL Mw. 2213, 2216 (2003).
149

1511

152

Id.

Blumenthal, supra note 94 at 1887.; Katz et al., supra note 120 at 40.
154 Brett et. al., supra note 151 at 2216.
155 Harris, supra note 27 (summarizing studies). See also, Chew et al., supra note 124 at 481 (in a
study of physician behavior, physicians self-reported that they would dispense samples of drugs that
were not their "preferred choice" because of the perceived benefits of samples. particularly avoiding
cost to patients).
156 Chew et al.. supra note 124 at 481.
157 Wazana, supra note 102 at 376 (reviewing the literature and finding that "Samples, continuing medical education ... and conference travel funding are felt to exert more influence (40 percent-50
percent) than promotional material does (22 percent)"); Sec also, Barclay, supra note 145 at 882.
l5X Dana & Loewenstein, supra note 118 at 254.
159 See, e.g.. Dana & Loewenstein, supra note 118; Brett et al., supra note 151.
l611 Dana & Loewenstein, supra note 118 at 254.
lOI Id. at 253.
162 Katz et al., supra note 120 at 40 (citing studies).
153
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First, individuaIs are unable to remain objective, even when they are
motivated to be impartial, demonstrating that self-serving bias is unintentional. Second, individuals deny and succumb to bias even when explicitly
instructed about it, which suggests that self-serving bias is unconscious.
Third, the studies show that self-interest affects choices indirectly, changing
the way individuals seek out and weigh the information on which they later
base their choices when they have a stake in the outcomes. 163
Pharmaceutical companies intentionally tap into the human predilection to
reciprocate favors, and they understand that this feeling of obligation can be triggered by small gifts as well as large:
The natural tendency for people to accept gifts and kind gestures reduces
their ability to choose to whom they wish to be indebted. This is how the
reciprocity rule can be exploited.... If physicians are to reciprocate for
small gifts, they cannot do so in any form they please. They are essentially
compelled to reciprocate by supporting their benefactor's productS. 164
Common sense dictates that "[t]he sheer ubiquity of trinkets given by pharmaceutical companies is evidence of their effectiveness; why else would profit-minded
companies continue to provide them?"165 The former president of Pfizer Pharmaceuticals has even stated that "marketing 'is almost as scientific as anything we
dO.'''166
It is not the value of the gift but the giving of the gift that triggers the sense of
obligation. 167 The establishment of this "gift relationship" that creates obligation in
the recipient has been well studied by social scientists and is found across cultures. 168
At the same time, the drug rep who creates this sense of obligation also knows that
patients will receive these drugs on a trial basis from physicians in whom they have
created a bias toward dispensing, and without the written warnings that typically
accompany full prescriptions. 169

IV.

DRUG SAMPLES AND THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY RULE

The fact that the pharmaceutical companies market prescription drugs in a way
that creates unconscious bias in physicians, with the purpose of increasing sales
through distribution of gifts and free samples, weakens the justification for the
learned intermediary rule in this context. The same bias that makes physicians
more inclined to distribute samples of drugs that have been promoted to them
also makes them less likely to be objective in learning about and then articulating
Id.
Id. at 42
165 Dana & Loewenstein, supra note 118 at 254.
166 Katz et al., supra note 120 at 42. (quoting ERIC CLARK, THE WANT MAKERS: THE WORLD OF
ADVERTlSING: How THEY MAKE Vou Buy 208 (1989».
167 Id. at 41 (citing research in sociology and anthropology exploring gift-giving and reciprocity).
168 Coyle, supra note 148 at 398 (citing research).
169 The written instructions and warnings provided to patients at the pharmacy are regulated by
state law and state Pharmacy Boards. Provision of written instructions is common. Email from Professor
Charles Krobot, Associate Dean for Academie Affairs, University of Nebraska College of Pharmacy
to Susan Poser, Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law (Dec. 1,2006) (on
file with author). See a/sa, ABOOD & BRUSHWOOD, supra note 80 at III (noting that many pharmacies
voluntarily provide written drug information when dispensing prescriptions).
163

164
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the risks of those drugs to their patients. Physicians befriended by drug reps may
take the information and misinformation provided by drug reps in the best possible light, underestimating the risks and over estimating the benefits of the drugs.
The drug reps create this bias yet their employers are protected from the results of
the physician's exercise of this bias, in the form of inadequate verbal warnings, as
long as a written warning is provided in the sample box and the physician's desk
reference.l7ü
Research has shown that patients receive minimal, and perhaps in sorne cases
incorrect, information when receiving samples. One study, involving observations
of 1,600 physician-patient interactions in family practice, found that samples were
distributed in almost 20 percent of office visits but "detailed patient education
regarding these drugs was rarely observed in patient encounters."171 When such
education was observed, it almost always consisted of verbal instructions about
dosing without discussion of drug interactions or information about other matters,
such as whether the drug should be taken with meals. 172
Many factors could contribute to physicians' distribution of samples without giving adequate verbal warnings. Physicians may simply be too busy to spend enough
time with patients. Physicians may also be misinformed by drug reps about the relative merits of drugs, or they might unconsciously feel obligated to those who have
given them gifts, bought lunch for their staff, and paid for their continuing legal
education and this may affect their willingness and ability to give adequate warnings. 173 If any of these factors exist, this conduct is negligent and physicians should
be held responsible for it, as informed consent law dictates. But the law should also
recognize the negligence, or even recklessness, of drug companies who knowingly
create a situation that is likely lead to patients receiving samples of prescription
drugs without proper oral instructions and written instructions or warnings.
Courts already recognize that intentionally creating bias in physicians in the
context of drug detailing can vitiate otherwise proper written warnings to physicians. A claim of overpromotion is a variation on the universally recognized claim
of a patient against a drug company if the company does not adequately warn the
physician. A patient can sue a prescription drug manufacturer directly for warning
defect if she can demonstrate that the drug company or its representatives promoted
its product "in such a fashion as to obscure or lessen the seller's cautionary warnings."174 Even if a drug manufacturer properly distributes FDA-approved warnings
to physicians, it can still be held liable for failure to warn if the drug reps act in such
a way as to contradict or minimize the importance of those warnings. 175
170 The unconscious nature of this bias is ironically illustrated by the AMA's own recently revised
ethics guidelines which explicitly permit gifts of drug samples despite the studies just discussed, and
condones their use by physicians and their families. Studdert et al., supra note 119 at 1897.
171 Backer et al., supra note 135 at 81 J.
172 Id. at 815.
l7J Wazana, supra note 102 at 373 (10 percent of continuing medical education is paid for by drug
companies).
174 M. Stuart Madden, The Enduring Paradox of Products Liability Law Relating ta Prescription
Pharmaceuticals, 21 PACE L. REV. 313, 330 (2001); See also Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1071
n.13 (8th Ciro 1989) (noting that overpromotion may cause the physician to rely on that promotion
rather than information from package inserts and warnings). Stevens V. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 CaI.3d
51 (1973) (same); Caraker v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., 172 F.Supp.2d 1018, 1030 (S.D.lll. 2001)
("the overpromotion theory is simply that by over-promoting a product, the over-promoter has deemphasized or diluted the full effect of the warnings."); Love V. Wolf, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1964) (same).
175 See Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 72 IlI.App.3d 540 (1979); Stevens v. Parke Davis & Co., 9 CaI.3d
51 (1973).
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For example, in Salmon v. Parke, Davis & CO.,176 the court held that a claim for
overpromotion was stated when a drug rep's gift to a physician of a promotional
calendar did not include a warning of the serious side effects of the drug it was
advertising. This conduct presented a question of fact as to whether the absence
of the warning on the calendar was significant enough to nullify written warnings
that accompanied the drug itself and were in the possession of the physician:
It is foreseeable that a calendar might remain on a physician's desk as a
constant reminder to prescribe a drug long after the sampie and its warning had been removed. A jury could infer, therefore, that the absence of a
warning on an advertisement for the use of a drug as potentially dangerous
as chloromycetin was a form of overpromotion which nullified the effect
of even a valid warning on the package. 177

This claim is a species of negligent marketing and has been stated on other kinds
of facts, such as when a drug company promotes a prescription drug for off-label
use. 178 If a jury were to find this to be overpromotion, then the patient who suffered
harm could get damages from the manufacturer directly for failure to warn because
the manufacturer did not fulfill its dutYto the physician to warn adequately.179 The
patient-plaintiff in such a case is essentially a third party beneficiary of the drug
company's dutYto the physician to warn of the drug's risks. This is a question of
fact, which must be decided on a case-by-case basis. 180
Unlike the overpromotion theory, which is a claim that the drug company failed
adequately to warn the physician, the exception to the learned intermediary rule
for cases involving the dutYto warn of risks from sample prescriptions drugs is a
claim that the drug company is negligent in failing to warn the consumer of the risks
from samples of prescription drugs. The practice of drug promotion is so intimately
linked to sample distribution that the plaintiff should not have to demonstrate the
connection in every situation. Rather, the widespread conduct and its implications
for patient safety, coupied with the drug company choosing to bypass the written
warnings provided when a prescription is written, should be enough to shift the
burden of proof on the learned intermediary rule in this context.
The way in which drug companies market prescription drug sampies negates the
standard justifications for the learned intermediary rule. As discussed above, these
justifications include 1) that the physician is in the best position to evaluate the
risks and benefits of the drug to the patient; 2) that drug companies lack effective
means to communicate risk; and 3) that direct warnings would interfere with the
doctor-patient relationship.181
Even though the physician has the dutYto obtain informed consent from the
patient, the likelihood that other factors, both conscious (the desire to continue
receiving attention and gifts) and unconscious (a sense of obligation to drug reps)
play a part in physicians' decision to give a sampie, suggest that the physician is not
in the best position to warn about risks when distributing drug samples. This is part
of the reason that some healthcare organizations now ban samples, and in some
cases, drug reps as weil. Many organizations, including the Mayo Clinic, Kaiser
Permanente, Stanford University, the Universities of Michigan, Pennsylvania and
176
177

178
179

180
181

520 F.2d 1359 (4th Ciro 1975).
Id. at 1363.
See generally, Ausness, supra note 45 at 133-135.
See Love V. Wolf, 249 Cal.App.2d 822, 823-833, 836-837 (1967).
Baldino v. Catagna, 505 Pa. 239, 248 (1984); 17 Am. Jur. Trials § 5 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
See, supra notes 44-54 and accompanyiüg text.
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Wisconsin, and even sorne private practices,182 have instituted such bans. Many others have called for such bans and sorne states have considered passing laws banning
samples. 183 The drug company, which creates the physician's conflict between his/her
dutYto his/her patient, on the one hand, and his/her own interests and those of the
drug company, on the other, should bear sorne of the risk of the conflict. It is not
that the drug company is in the best position to evaluate the needs of the patient.
Rather, the drug companies' marketing techniques can interfere with the physician's
capacity for independentjudgment in such a way as to prevent the physician from
being in the best position to evaluate the needs of patients. 184
Applying the learned intermediary rule to harm from sampIe prescription drugs
encourages drug companies to attempt to influence physicians with the single goal
of increasing prescriptions and without concern for the health of the patient or the
absence of the safety net of written warnings from the pharmacy. 185 Their goal in
giving samples is to hook patients on brand-name drugs so that they subsequently
request full prescriptions of that drug. As Jerry Avorn has pointed out, "[I]t's not
helpful to pretend that pharmaceutical companies are bound by a different set of
economic rules that are somehow gentler or nobler than those that determine the
fates of companies that sell oil, food, or hair care products. "186 As discussed above,
sorne states require pharmacies to include medication guides with prescription drugs,
and in states without such regulation, many pharmacies do so voluntarily.187 This
extra layer of warning is absent when a patient receives a sampIe directly from a
physician, and that absence benefits drug companies. Pharmacists play a key role in
the safety of prescription drugs, a role from which they are excluded when samples
are dispensed by physicians. As one pharmacist explained:
Prescriptions are checked for proper dosing, drug-drug interactions, and
disease interactions. Patients receive a printout about the medication,
which includes detailed instructions for proper administration (including
whether to take with food or on an empty stomach and whether or not to
separate doses from other medications), side effects, warnings and what to
do in case of a missed dose. Pharmacists often provide additional instruclX2 Saul, Drug Makers Payfor Lunch as They Pitch, supra note 99 (University of Pennsylvania and
University of Michigan Health System have banned meals provided by drug reps.); Charles Schmidt,
Managing the Pharma Freebies, MODERN DRUG DISCOVERY, (Sept. 2002), at 23 (A]bany Medical Center, in Albany, N.Y has banned drug samp]es, as has Boston Univ. Medica] Center); Fred Charatan,
Hmpital Bans Free Drug Samples, 174 WEST 1. MED. 236, 236 (200]) (the Univ. of Wisconsin Hospita]
has instituted a voucher program to replace free samp]es); Bonnie Oarves, Tao Closefor Cam/art? How
Some Physicians are Reexamining Their Dealings with Drug Delai/ers, ACP OBSERVER, (July 2003),
http://www.aeponline.orgijourna]s/news/ju]-aug03/drug.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2007) (noting that many
hospitals and physicians' offices have banned what they cali "drug detai]ing," the practice of allowing
drug reps. to meet with doctors and explain the benefits of their firm's drugs); See also, Wazana, supra
note 102 (identifying generaJ concerns in the medical industry over relationships between doctors and
pharmaceutica] reps.). See general/y, Roni Caryn Rabin, Free Drug Samples? Bad Idea, Some Say, N.Y
TIMES, (May], 2007) at 05.
183 Charatan, supra note] 82 at 236-237; Brennan et al. supra note 90 at 43] -433 (proposing that
samples be banned in academic medica] centers and replaced with vouchers for ]ow-income patients).
1" Michae] Davis, Conf/ict of Interest in ] BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL ETIllcs JOURNAL] 7,2] (1982)
(defining confliet of interest as the professiona] having an interest that interferes with the professional's
ability to exercise professional judgment).
185 Katz et al., supra note 119 at 42 ("the main objective of drug-company gift-giving is to create
relationships and interests on the part of recipient physicians that eonflict with their primary obligation
to act in the best interest of their patient.").
186 AVORI', supra note 96 at 302.
m Sec ABOOD & BRUSIIWOOD supra note 80 at ] 12; supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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tions on proper use, as with inhalers or nasal sprays, for example. When
a physician provides a sampie, much of this information is neglected. The
drug sample may interact with the patient's other medications or the patient may not understand the proper administration (e.g., with or without
food), proper use (e.g., inhalers), and warnings (e.g., avoid driving). In
addition, there is often no instruction label, so patients may forget dosage
or how often to take the medication. Patients also do not receive a drug
leaflet or any other printed information. If the physician does not record
the sampie in the patient's chart, there may be no documentation that the
patient received the drug at ail. This could be crucial in the case of a severe
adverse reaction or drug allergy because patients often do not know the
names of their medications. 188
Drug companies do not lack effective means to communicate the risk of samples,
the second standard justification for the learned intermediary rule. 189 Sorne drug
manufacturers do in fact provide prescribing information with the sample,190 while
others make implicit claims that they do. For example, one study found that 62 percent
of the labels on the inside package of sample prescription drugs referred the user to
"enclosed prescribing information" but that for 27.3 percent of those samples, no such
information was included with the packaging of that individual sample or group of
samples. 191 This study included samples of sorne common prescription drugs including Augmentin, Celebrex, Cipro, Coumadin, Paxil, Prozac, Viagra and Zithromax. l92
FDA only requires that a package insert be included in the larger packaging of the
samples from which individual samples are removed and distributed. Furthermore,
the package insert, as will be discussed below, is not intended for patients. It is trade
labeling that is written in technicallanguage and printed in very small font. 193 Yet
drug companies purport in their inside labeling of individual samples to be directing the user to this insert. Thus, drug companies hold themselves out to patients as
capable of providing warnings, going so far as to direct users to utilize these warnings,
without actually providing appropriate warnings.
Pharmaceutical companies have many options for warning patients of risks. ln
the research discussed above, 31 percent of the samples studied included patient
instruction pamphlets inside the individual boxes of samples. Drug companies can
write these warnings, or use the resources that pharmacists use when they provide
written information to patients about prescription drugs (most of which are probably written by the drug companies).194
Harris. supra note 27.
See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
190 Jennifer L. Dili & Joyce A. Generali. Medication Sample Labeling Practices. 57 AM. 1. HEALTHSYSTEM PHARMACISTS 2087.2089 (2000).
191 Id.
192 Id. at 2088.
193 See infi"a notes 228-31 and accompanying text.
194 Abood and Brushwood, in discussing voluntary provision of patient information by pharmacies
state that not all pharmacies provide such information. and they continue
This lack of provision of written information to patients by pharmacists is difficult to
understand because materials are available from several sources, inc1uding the American
Pharmaceutical Association. the United States Pharmacopeial Convention (USPC), the
American Society of Health System Pharmacists. and the National Community Pharmacists
Association .... The USPC publishes a four-volume set of books known as the USP-Dispensing Information. This publication provides drug information for both the pharmacist
and the patient.
ABOOD & BRUSHWOOD, supra note 8U at 112.
188

189
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Finally, it is implausible to claim that the learned intermediary rule in this
context protects the doctor-patient relationship and that providing warnings on
sample prescription drugs would interfere with that relationship. The promotion
techniques used by drug reps interfere with that relationship by creating an unconscious bias and sense of obligation in physicians. 195 The risk of unlabeled samples
is then imposed on a public that is largely not aware of drug company's aggressive
promotions to physicians and the bias it creates. 196
For these reasons, sample prescription drugs present a stronger case for an
exception to the learned intermediary rule than either DTC advertising or contraceptives. Fundamentally, the learned intermediary rule addresses the issue of who
is the "more efficient purveyor of information" to the patient. 197 Advertising does
not necessarily prevent the physician from remaining the most efficient purveyor
of information. Even when DTC advertising is seen by the patient, the patient still
must ask the physician for the drug and receive a prescription, so the physician
arguably remains the more efficient conveyer of information about the risks and
side effects of the drug. 198
DTC advertising, if it is misleading, misleads people into thinking they need a
drug or misleads them about the safety of a drug. This type of advertising is aimed
at the patient, which should not affect the physician's decisionmaking and communication process, except to the extent that it might require the physician to discuss
a drug that she might not otherwise have considered if the patient requests it, and
perhaps disappoint a patient who had requested a particular drug. The physician is
arguably an equal or stronger counterweight to the influence of advertising because
she is seeing the patient in-person and knows that particular patient's condition.
Doctors are not the most efficient purveyors of information as to samples,
however. Marketing to physicians is intended to affect their relationship with their
patients by creating a bias in favor of using a drug which the patient, presumably
unaware of the pressures on the physician, is not in a position to counter. 199 It is,
of course, likely that drug companies will advertise a drug in the mass media while
at the same time promoting it to physicians. For those drugs, the physician is in a
doubly difficuIt position when it cornes to warnings.
The case for an exception to the learned intermediary rule for drug samples is
also stronger than the case for contraceptives. In MacDonald, discussed above,
the court emphasized the fact that patients taking oral contraceptives are likely to
have questions about side effects between annuaI office visits, and therefore need
warnings written in clear, lay language to which they can refer. 20o But in that case,
as with most prescription drugs, sorne written warnings were made available to the
patient. There was an FDA-required medication insert, and possibly voluntary or
state-mandated warnings and instructions that accompanied the drug when it was
dispensed at the pharmacy.
See supra notes 153-169 and accompanying text.
Katz et al., supra note 120 at 42 ("Patients tend to be aware that physicians accept gifts, unaware
whether their own physicians accept gifts, and feel that gifts are more influentia1 and less appropriate
than do their physicians").
197 Ausness, supra note 45 at 106-107.
]OR Id.; see a/sa Paytash supra note 43 at 1356 (noting that most courts do not see DTC advertising as something that should create an exception to the learned intermediary rule, but that at least one
court has suggested, in dicta, that it cou1d).
199 Together, of course, these influences cou1d be considered overwhelmingly against patient interests
by "heighten[ing] the tension between current marketing practices and good patient care." Brennan et
al., supra note 90 at 431.
200 MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 69-70 (Mass. 1985).
195

196
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Sample prescription drugs are distributed to patients in an entirely different
context. Drug companies know when samples are not individually labeled and they
know that the samples are likely to be separated from the insert that is included in
the sample box. They also know that the safety net of pharmacy warnings will not
be present. With unlabeled samples, patients are not given the choice whether to
read, and retain, instructions and warnings. It is common knowledge that people
often do not use aIl of the samples that they are given, and they place them in
medicine cabinets, where, unlike other prescription and OTC drugs, they remain
without special packaging, instructions and warnings to alert others to their contents and risks. 201
There are both legal and prudential objections that might be raised to the
proposition that the law should carve out an exception to the learned intermediary rule for harm resulting from prescription drug samples. On the legal side, even
if a court were persuaded by the claims in this article about the advantages of
the exception for samples, drug companies would still be able to raise a claim of
regulatory compliance and preemption. 202 That is, even without the shield of the
learned intermediary rule, drug companies could argue that they should not be
liable for failure to warn of the risks from prescription drug samples because they
complied with federal regulations regarding the labeling of samples and, additionally, imposing liability would interfere with the federal scheme of prescription drug
regulation. On the prudential side, there are several potential objections, including
the relative fault of physicians in these situations, and the downsides of a liability
rule that might lead drug companies either to increase warnings on samples or
eliminate the distribution of samples entirely. These downsides include expense,
waste, overwarning, and the loss of the benefits to doctors and patients, particulady poor patients, of free samples. Finally, one might object that addressing the
problem of unlabeled samples through liability in tort is not the optimal or most
efficient way to deal with the problem of marketing of prescription drugs. Each
of these will be addressed in turn.

v. THE REGULATORY COMPLIANCE AND PREEMPTION DEFENSES
Even if a judge-made exception to the learned intermediary doctrine were recognized, drug manufacturers might still raise two related legal defenses: regulatory
compliance and preemption. Under the "regulatory compliance" defense,203 the
drug company can claim that its compliance with federal regulations renders its
conduct not negligent. That is, compliance with FDA regulations constitutes not the
minimal acceptable conduct but rather the extent of the dutYto label prescription
drugs. The preemption defense is that FDA regulates warning labels on prescription
drugs and specifies the type of instructions and warnings that must be placed on
individual samples. Any decision by a state court that drug manufacturers should
have placed warning labels on drug samples beyond FDA requirements should
be preempted by FDA regulations because such a decision would conflict with
Congress's regulatory scheme.
Neither of these related defenses should prevent a finding that drug manufacturers have a dutYto warn patients of the risks of prescription drug samples.
See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of these defenses, see infra Part V
211.' Robert Rabin refers to this as a "close cousin" of the preemption defense. Robert L. Rabin,
Kevnote Papa' Reassessing Regu!atory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049, 2053 (2000).
2111

2112
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Regulatory compliance is often considered good evidence of reasonable conduct,
but is not dispositive on the issue. 204 The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability confirms this widely adopted view of regulatory compliance in general,2°s
and as it applies to government-mandated warnings on prescription drugs, by recognizing that compliance with such warnings does not necessarily prec1ude state
tort liability.206
The proposition that FDA approval of drug warnings preempts state law c1aims
for inadequate warnings has gained traction in recent years both in the courts and
among sorne scholars. In the Preamble to a recent revision of drug labeling rules,
FDA itself stated that it intends its regulations to preempt state law c1aims. 207 Upon
c10ser inspection, however, the case of drug samples can be distinguished from even
the most expansive view of federal preemption in the drug-Iabe1ing context. The
overriding reason why preemption and regulatory compliance should not prevent
c1aims against drug manufacturers for failing to warn is that FDA's attention to
sample prescription drug labeling is cursory and not an integral part of its prescription drug labeling scheme.
Before discussing the role that these defenses might play in the context of litigation involving harm from a sample prescription drug, it is useful to review briefly
how Congress and FDA regulate sample prescription drugs.

A. Federal Regulation of Prescription Drug Samples
Prescription drugs are regulated by FDA acting under the authority of the
FDCA20S as amended by the Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987 (PDMA). 209
PDMA's attention to drug samples is primarily to outlaw their sale and to limit
their distribution with the aim of shutting down the black market in prescription
drugS. 21O Under the law, "No person may sell, purchase or trade or offer to sell,
purchase or trade any drug sample."211 The Act defines a drug sample as "a unit
of a drug, subject to subsection (b) of this section [section (b) defines prescription drugs], which is not intended to be sold and is intended to promote the sale
204 See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability § 4 (1997); Ellen Relkin, Warnings in
Pharmaceutical Cases: JO' the Learned Jntermediary Obsolete in the New Millennium?, SF28 ALI-ABA
227,235 (2000) CH is ... beyond cavil that FDA regulations constitute 'minimum standards. ''') (citation
omitted).
205 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 4(b) (1997) states:
a product's compliance with an applicable product safety statute or administrative regulation is properly considered in determining whether the product is defective with respect to
the risks sought to be reduced by the statute or regulation, but such compliance does not
preclude as a matter of law a finding of product defect.
206 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 6 cmt. b (1997).
207 This "preemption by preamble" is a growing phenomenon among federal agencies and appears
also in recent regulations by the Consumer Product Safety Commission and the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies
and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L, REV. (forthcoming 2007) (on file with author).
208 21 U.S.c. §§ 301-399 (2000).
209 Pub. L, No. 100-293, 102 Stat. 95 (1987). The PDMA was in turn amended by the Prescription
Drug Amendments Act in 1992, Pub. L, No. 102-353, 106 Stat. 941 (1992). Jennifer A. Romanski, The
Final Sampling Regulations of the Prescription Drug Marketing Act Are A live and Weil: ls your Sampling
Program Compliant? 58 FOOD & DRUG L,I 649, 649 (2003).
210 Romanski, supra note 209 at 649; see also, Erica L, Niezgoda & Maureen M. Richardson,
Federal Food and Drug Act Violations, 35 AM. CRIM. L, REV. 767, 786 (1998) (describing the criminal
sanctions levied by the Act).
211 21 U.S.c. § 353(c)(I) (2000).
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of the drug."212 Distribution of samples (as opposed to sale) is limited by the Act
to manufacturers and authorized distributors,213 and the provision of samples by
certain healthcare providers to patients is not considered distribution under the
Act.214 Thus, Congress implicitly acknowledged the legality and ubiquity of samples
as promotional material and sought in PDMA to prevent them from getting into
the wrong hands.
The statute sets out the requirements for the distribution of drug samples to
physicians, healthcare professionals, and healthcare entities such as hospitals or
pharmacies. 215 These requirements inc1ude a written request for the sample by a
practitioner licensed to prescribe, and execution of a written receipt by the recipient
that is returned to the drug manufacturer. The Act also contains requirements for
the proper storage and inventory of drug samples. 216 Apart from making it explicitly
legal, the provision of free drug samples by healthcare practitioners to patients is
not addressed in the statute.
Federallaw also prohibits the introduction into commerce of any drug that is
misbranded. 217 Misbranding inc1udes labeling that is false or misleading. 218 Although
drugs are considered misbranded if they are packaged without certain information
such as the name of the manufacturer and a statement of the contents, there is an
exception for "small packages," as determined by FDA. 219 Thus, with the exception
of rather stringent statutory language intended to prevent a market in prescription
drug samples, Congress itself did not focus on samples in its statutory scheme addressing the distribution and labeling of prescription drugs.
Under the authority of the FDCA and PDMA, FDA further regulates the labeling of prescription drugs. Its most stringent regulation of samples picks up on
PDMA's prohibition on the sale of samples and its concern with a black market.
FDA specifies many aspects of the transaction between drug manufacturers and
healthcare practitioners, inc1uding the content of the reg uest and receipt of samples
and who must sign for them. 220 There are different regulations for distribution by
mail as opposed to in-person by representatives of drug companies;221 provisions
on the proper storage and handling of samples;222 and rules about donation of drug
samples to charity.223 These regulations follow 10gically from Congress' objective
of preventing a black market in sampIe prescription drugs.
There are several kinds of FDA-approved labeling for prescription drugs. The
first goes by several names, inc1uding "professional labeling," "package insert,"
"direction circular" or "package circular." 224 This is the labeling that is written
for the physician to educate the physician about the drug so that the physician
can prescribe the drug appropriately and properly counsel patients. 225 These labels
accompany drugs when the manufacturer sends them to the pharmacy, and they
also must be put in the Physician's Desk Reference (PDR), the standard reference
Id.
m 21 US.c. § 353(d) (2000).
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 21 US.c. § 33(a) (2000).
218 21 US.c. § 352(a) (2000).
219 21 US.c. § 352(b) (2000).
220 See Romanski, supra note 209 at 653-654.
221 Niezgoda & Richardson, supra note 210 at 769-864.
m 21 C.F.R. § 203.32 (2006).
223 21 C.F.R. § 203.39 (2006).
224 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological
Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922 (Jan.24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 CFR pts. 201, 314, 601).
225 Id.
m
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source about prescription drugs for physicians. 226 Under the learned intermediary
rule, it is with this kind of labeling that the drug manufacturer fulfiIls its dutY to
warn the physician and the pharmacist. The content of these inserts must be in
8-point type. 227
"Trade labeling" is the labeling that is "on or within the package from which a
prescription drug is to be dispensed. "228 Trade labeling must also accompany packages of samples when they are distributed to physicians. 229 FDA has found that
physicians tend to reference trade labeling substantiaIly less often than other types
of labeling. 230 The contents of trade labeling must be in 6-point type.23 1
Certain promotional materials that accompany prescription drugs must also be
properly labeled in 8-point type. Promotional materials that require labeling include
virtuaIly aIl kinds of printed, visual, and audio matter supplied by a manufacturer
that describe a drug. 232 This type of labeling must also receive FDA approval.233 AlI
of the labeling thus far described is written by drug manufacturers and addressed
to healthcare providers, not patients, as part of the dut Y to disclose the risks of
prescription drugs.
FDA-approved patient labeling, also known as medication guides or patient
package inserts, is intended for patients and is required for certain prescription
drugS. 234 In the 1970s, FDA required medication guides for oral contraceptives. 235
These were the medication guides at issue in the MacDonald case.236 Since then, FDA
has required patient labeling for asthma inhalation medicines and IUDs, among
others. 237 In 1979, and again in 1995, FDA proposed rules requiring patient package
inserts for nearly aIl prescriptions drugs, but in both cases the rules were eventually
withdrawn because of opposition from the pharmaceutical industry.238 Yet, in 1996,
an FDA representative stated that "[i]n this day and age ... it is inconceivable that
a patient should leave the pharmacy without written advice about how to get the
maximum benefit out of their medication."239
In January 2006, FDA revised the labeling regulations for package inserts for
prescription drugs. This is the type of labeling directed at healthcare providers, not
226 Ausness supra note 45 at 100; Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, A Prescription For Drug
Liability and Regulation, 58 OKLA. L. REY. 135, 160 (2005); Requirements on Content and Format of

Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3972 (citing studies
showing that the POR is "the most frequently used reference book in a clinical setting").
227 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological
Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3971.
228 Id. at 3979.
229 Id. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text for discussion of package inserts.
230 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Orug and Biological
Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3958.
231 Id. at 3955.
232 21 C.F.R. 202.1 (1)(2) (2006).
2JJ Requirements on Content and Format of Labe1ing for Human Prescription Orug and Biological
Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3957.
234 See, e.g.. 28 C.F.R. § 208.I(c) (2006) ("Patient labeling will be required if the FDA determines
that one or more of the following circumstances exists: 1) The drug product is one for which patient
labeling could help preyent serious adverse effects 2) The drug product is one that has serious risk(s)
(relative to benefits) of which patients should be made aware because information concerning the
risk(s) could affect patients' decision to use, or to continue to use, the product. 3) The drug product is
important to health and patient adherence to directions for use is crucial to the drug's effectiveness.")
235 MacDonald Y. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. 475 N.E.2d 65, 67 (Mass. 1985); Walsh et al., supra
note 34 at 823.
236 MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 67.
m Paytash, supra note 43 at 1354; Walsh et al., supra note 34 at 829.
238 Walsh et al., supra note 34 at 830.
239 Justina A. Molzon, The FDA's Perspective on the Future of Pharmacy, 44 DRAKE L. REY. 463,
464 (1996).
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patients. The changes to the regulations were designed "to make it easier for healthcare
practitioners to find and read information important for the safe and effective use of
prescription drugS."240 The changes involved reorganization and format changes to
labels; sorne graphics changes; and the addition of a table of contents and a "highlights" section to draw attention to the most important prescribing information. 241
FDA now requires 8-point type on aIl types of labeling (e.g., package inserts and
promotional materials) except trade labeling (e.g., the labeling that accompanies
packaging of samples), which only requires 6-point type. 242 This is consistent with
findings that physicians tend not to consult trade labeling. 243 The revised regulations
were aimed at healthcare providers who make the decision whether to prescribe a drug
and have the dutYto inform the patient about the risks and benefits of the drugS. 244
These revisions were part of a larger FDA initiative to make prescription drugs safer.
The initiative includes regulations promulgated in 2004 requiring bar codes on certain
drugs, which are intended to permit healthcare practitioners to scan drugs before
dispensing them in order to reduce errors in hospitals. 245 In January 2007, FDA issued a report announcing that it would study and improve its oversight of the safety
of prescription drugs after they reach the market.246
FDA takes a much less rigorous approach to the labeling of prescription drug
samples than to the labeling of prescription drugs in general. FDA requires minimal
labeling on the sample unit itself. The unit must contain a control or lot number
so that it can be tracked (records of those lot numbers must then be retained by
the distributor of the sample), and it must contain language indicating it is not for
individual sale. 247 The 2006 revisions of prescription drug labeling regulations address samples only insofar as the new regulations affected trade labeling. 248 Although
FDA received comments asking them to provide more information on drug sampIe
units, FDA declined to make the change, citing the already existing requirement
that trade labeling be included in the packaging of sampIe units. 249
240 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Ruman Prescription Drug and Biological
Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3970 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 CFR pts. 201, 314, 601).
241 Id.
242 Id. at 3958; FDA, FDA Guidance for Industry: Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products-Implementing the New Content and Format Requirements, http://www.fda.gov/
cder/guidance/6005dft.htm (last visted Feb. 19,2007).
243 See supra, note 230 and accompanying text.
244 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Ruman Prescription Drug and Biological
Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3922 (citing 21 USe. § 353(b), which defines prescription drugs as those that
have certain properties making them "not safe for use except under the supervision of a practitioner
licensed by law to administer such drug. ").
245 See, 21 e.F.R. § 201.25 (2006). The bar code requirements in the 2004 regulations do not apply
to samples. 21 e.F.R. § 201.25(b)(l)(i)(A) (2006). See also, Bar Code Label Requirement for Ruman
Drug Products and Biological Products, 69 Fed. Reg. 9120, 9123 (Feb. 26, 2004) (codified at 21 e.F.R.
Pts. 20 l, 606, and 610) ("We proposed to exclude prescription drug samples because most samples are
given to patients at physicians' offices, and we did not believe that physicians or patients would have or
be inclined to buy bar code scanners for their own use in the immediate future.")
246 Press Release, FDA, FDA Reinforces Commitment to Drug Safety: Progress Underway, New
Initiatives Announced in Response to Institute of Medicine Recommendations (Jan. 30,2007), available
at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2007/NEW01551.html
247 21 e.F.R. § 203.38 (2006).
248 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Ruman Prescription Drug and Biological
Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3979.

Id. See also, 21 e.F.R. § 201.56(b) (2006). Trade labeling requirements include:
l)Labeling on or within the package from which the drug is to be dispensed bears adequate
information for its use, including indications, effects, dosages, routes, methods, and frequency
and duration of administration, and any relevant hazards, contraindications, side effects and
precautions under which practitioners licensed by law to administer the drug can use the
drug safely and for the purposes for which it is intended, including aU purposes for which it
is advertised or represented. 21 e.F.R. 201.100(c) (2006).
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This brief tour through the federal scheme of regulation of samples and prescription drug labeling demonstrates that neither Congress nor FDA has made sample
prescription drugs a key focus of their prescription drug labeling scheme. The focus
of federal regulation of samples is on preventing a black market by prohibiting their
sale and regulating their distribution to healthcare providers. FDA's labeling concerns
focus primarily on getting the right kind of information in the right format to the
healthcare providers and pharmacists so that they can make appropriate prescribing and dispensing decisions and effectively counsel patients. 250 The package insert
plays a dual role-it is both included with the prescription drug when it goes to the
pharmacy so that the pharmacist knows what he/she is dispensing and can run drug
interaction checks, and it is placed in the PDR for the physician or other healthcare
provider. These parallel warning tracks are an important part of FDA's regulatory
scheme. This article contends that provision of samples without warnings to a patient
disrupts rather than reinforces FDA's focus on providing adequate information to
healthcare professionals so that they can adequately counsel patients.

B. The Preemption and Regulatory Compliance Defenses
Preemption is an affirmative defense that liability based on state law should be
foreclosed because it would interfere with Congress' regulatory scheme. Historically,
the preemption analysis begins and ends with Congressional intent.251 The doctrine,
rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,252 is divided into express preemption, which bases preemption on language in the statute that shows Congress'
express intent to override state law, and implied preemption, where the courts look
to the overall purposes and effects of the statute and regulatory scheme to discern if
Congress intended to foreclose alternative state requirements. Implied preemption
is further divided into the sometimes-overlapping categories of conflict and field
preemption. Conflict preemption applies to situations where state requirements
would conflict with the federal regulatory scheme, and field preemption applies
in situations where the courts discern that Congress intended federal regulation
to coyer the entire substantive field ta the exclusion of state requirements. 253 The
Supreme Court has held that federallaw can preempt not just state laws that address the same subject as federallaw, but also state tort liability insofar as the latter
acts as a form of regulation by imposing damages and creating strong incentives
for defendants to change their conduct to avoid liability:
[State] regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through sorne form of preventive relief The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing
conduct and controlling policy.254
250 For example, the new format of the package inserts includes a Patient Counseling Information
Section, which is prominently displayed. FDA, Informationfor Healthcare Professionals on FDA's New
Prescribing Informationfor Drugs, http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/physLabel/physLabeLHCP.htm
(last visited Feb. 19,2007).
251 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 US. 504, 516 (1992); Sharkey, supra note 207 at 5 ("Congressional intent is at the heart of conventional preemption analysis. ").
252 US. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2 (the laws of the United States "shaH be the supreme Law of the Land
... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
25) OWEN, supra note 47 at § 14.4; Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 US. 861, 869--874 (2000).
254 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 US. 504, 521 (1992) (quoting San Diego Building Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 US. 236,247 (1959». See also Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA Must Preempt
Tort Litigation: A Critique of Chevron Deference and a Response to Richard Nagareda, 1 1. Tort L. 5, 8
(2006), http://www.bepress.com/jtl/voll /iss l/art5.
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Because there is no express preemption in the FDCA concerning the dutY to
warn on prescription drugs,255 preemption would have to be implied. Courts will
find implied preemption of astate common law duty to warn if the drug company
cannot cornply with the state law dutY and the federal law at the same time, or
if the common law dutYwill be an obstacle to the implementation of Congress'
purpose in enacting the federallaw. 256 The Supreme Court has stated that federal
statutes should, at least initially, be subject to a "presumption against preemption,"
particularly in areas of law that the States have historically regulated. 257
[B]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we
have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-Iaw
causes of action. In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which
Congress has legislated ... in a field which the States have traditionally
occupied ... we start with the assumption that the historie police powers
of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. 25S
The health and safety of its citizens is one of those fields traditionally occupied
by state law. 259
Until relatively recently, FDA itself took the position that state tort liability was
generally not preempted by prescription drug labeling regulations. 26o In originally promulgating its rules for patient labeling of prescription contraceptives, FDA was aware
that the regulations might be used to bolster an independent state tort dutYto provide
patient information. As a result, FDA stated that this labeling was "not intended to 'affect adversely the standard of civil tort liability which is imposed on drug manufactures
and dispensers."'261 In other words, the federal requirements per se should not give rise
to other duties. 262 FDA labeling regulation rather serves "primarily as an informational
adjunct to the physician-patient encounter and is intended to reinforce and augment oral
information given by the physician to the patient at the tirne the drug is prescribed."263
In MacDonald, the court was careful to say that it was not basing the exception to the
leamed intermediary rule on the fact that patient wamings were required by federal
regulations. The court instead found independent reasons for the dutYto wam, such as
the patient's involvement in the decision to use contraceptives and the need for written
instructions and wamings between office visits. 264
By analogy, this means that in the case of labeling of prescription drug samples,
the minimal FDA requirements for labeling should not affect state-Iaw duties owed
Hall, supra note 38 at 229.
Caraker v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1031 (S.D.lIl. 2001).
257 Geier, 529 U.S. at 871-·873 (2000).
258 Medtronic, [ne. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (internaI citations omitted).
259 Caraker, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1032.
260 See Caraker, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1036 ("there is evidence that FDA has seen the utility of state
products liability daims despite their approval of the prescription drug in question. See, e.g., 59 Fed.Reg.
3944,3948 (1994) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 20.63(1) ('FDA recognizes the sophistication and complexity
of private tort Iitigation in the United States and the proposed preemption action is not intended to
frustrate or impede tort litigation in this area. Indeed, FDA recognizes that product liability plays an
important role in consumer protection.') 44 Fed.Reg. 37,434, 37,447 (1979)"); This regulation section
has now been amended, see 21 C.F.R. § 20.63(1) (2006); OWEN, supra note 47 at § 14.4.
261 Walsh et aL, supra note 34 at 867, n.178 (quoting 43 Fed. Reg. 4214, 4214 (1978) (codified as
21 C.F.R. pt. 310».
255

256

263

Id.
Id.

264

MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 71 (Mass. 1985).

262
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by drug manufacturers to consumers. Seemingly in agreement, as recently as 2000,
FDA stated that its labeling regulations did not preempt state law. 265 For the most
part, courts have interpreted the FDCA not to forec1ose state tort liability for failure
to warn of risks from prescription drugs, even when the drug manufacturer had
complied with federallabeling requirements. 266 Courts have interpreted Congress'
intent in passing the FDCA and delegating rulemaking to FDA to create minimal
standards for warnings on prescription drugs, which drug companies and state law
may enhance with more extensive information. 267
One of the reasons that courts have rejected implied preemption for prescription
drug labeling is that FDA regulations themselves permit drug manufacturers to add
warnings to labels if the manufacturers discover new side effects that warrant warnings
after their labels have been approved by FDA. Under FDA's regulations, labels must be
revised "as soon as there is reasonable evidence of an association of a serious hazard
with a drug; a causal re1ationship need not have been provided."268 The manufacturer
can make these changes without FDA approval, as long as FDA is notified. 269
An illustrious case is Caraker v. Sandoz. 270 The plaintiff in Caraker suffered a
stroke after taking the drug Palodel, a postpartum lactation-control drug. 271 The
court held that Illinois' common law duty to warn was not preempted by the FDCA
or FDA's regulations about prescription drug labeling because FDA standards were
intended to be minimum standards. 272 FDA permitted and even encouraged state
law to require pharmaceutical companies to inc1ude known risks, even if discovered
after the labeling had been approved by FDA. 273
This interpretation of Congress' intent is different from courts' interpretation
of Congress' intent in other health and safety statutes that address warnings. For
example, in statutes dealing with medical devices,274 nonprescription drugs 275 and

See Weiss v. Fujisawa Pharmaeeutical Co., 464 F Supp. 2d 666, 669-670 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
Caraker v. Sandoz Pharmaeeuticals Corp., 172 F Supp. 2d 1018, 1033-1034 (S.D.m. 2001), Motus
v. Pfizer, Inc., 127 F Supp. 2d 1085,1095 (C.D.Ca!. 2000), Cartwright v. Pfizer, 369 FSupp.2d 8766 (E.D.Tex.
2005): See generally, Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 1353, 1389 (products cases "typically present themselves as part of an incomplete federal regime.").
267 Robert Rabin correctly points out that, notwithstanding what courts say, FDA itself does not
really consider its approval of new prescription drug labeling to be providing for a bare minimum of
safety. Rather, it is engaging in a risk benefit analysis in order to provide the optimal amount of information communicated in the optimal manner. Rabin, supra note 203 at 2055-2056. This does not predude
states from imposing more stringent standards, but it does make language about minimal standards
somewhat misleading.
268 21 C.FR. § 201.57(e) (2006).
269 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) (2006).
270 172 F Supp. 2d 1018 (S.D. III 2002).
271 Id. at 1022.
272 Id. at 1031-1032.
265

266

273

Id.

Medical Deviee Amendment to the FDCA, 21 o.S.c. § 360k(a) (2000) ("no State or political
subdivision of aState may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human
use any requirement-I) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement under this chapter
to the deviee, and 2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the deviee or to any other matter
induded in a requirement applicable to the deviee under this chapter."). See Buckman v. Plaintiffs'
Legal Committee, 531 o.S. 341 (2001) (MDA preempts fraud-on-the-FDA daim); but see Medtronic
v. Lohr, 518 o.S. 470 (1996) (finding no preemption for design defect in paeemaker under the Medical
Deviee Amendments to the FDCA.).
275 National Uniformity for Nonprescription Drugs Act, 21 o.S.c. § 379r (2000) ("(a) In general
Exeept as provided in subsection (b), (c)(I), (d), (e), or (f) of this section, no State or political subdivision of aState may establish or continue in effect any requirement-I) that relates to the regulation of a
drug that is not subject to the requirements of section 353(b)(I) or 353(f)(I)(A) of this title; and 2) that is
different from or in addition to, or that is otherwise not identical with, a requirement under this Act, the
Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970 (15 o.S.c. 1471 et seq.), or the Fair Packaging and Labeling
Act (15 o.S.c. 1451 et seq.)").
274
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cigarettes,276 courts have found preemption in failure to warn cases, based on the
express language of the statute.
There is a legitimate concern that imposing tort liability on drug manufacturers
who are in compliance with federallabeling requirements wiUlead drug companies
to overwarn, perhaps increasing the content of their warning labels to the extent
that they render aU of the warnings ineffective. 277 This concern also applies to the
regulatory compliance defense for drug labeling:
Pharmaceutical companies have real incentives to adopt a warnings strategy that warns of nearly everything. Such a warnings strategy conflicts,
however, with the FDA's regulatory goals of both reliability and brevity.
Overwarning is also not in the interests of consumers because it hinders
the ability of healthcare professionals to distinguish the relative risks posed
by various drugs. Sorne courts have correctly recognized that the present
litigation environment creates incentives for manufacturers to adopt a
warnings strategy that actuaUy hinders these goals. 278
It has been shown that people who are given too many warnings tend to be
unable to differentiate between the more and less significant warnings and either
ignore aU of them, or place too much significance on minimal risks. 279 As discussed
above, this is one of the main justifications for the learned intermediary rule~that
physicians are more competent than patients to weigh risks appropriately, determine
if the risks of the prescription drugs are worth the benefits, and communicate the
decision to the patient. 28ü The issue of overwarning is an important consideration
in the labeling of nonJprescription, OTC drugs where there is no learned intermediary and where Congress, in giving regulatory authority to FDA, has expressly
preempted state tort liability over failure to warn. 281
Despite the history of non-preemption in this area, recent statements by FDA and
recent Supreme Court rulings have raised new questions about preemption. Over
the past six years, FDA has routinely asserted that its regulations on prescription
drug labeling preempt state law, despite the absence of express preemption in the
statute and the long history of FDA's own position against preemption. FDA's new
position first came to light most prominently in an amicus brief that it filed in 2002
in the case of Motus v. Pfizer. 282 That case involved the issue of whether Pfizer, the
manufacturer of the prescription anti-depressant drug Zoloft, should have warned
276 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504 (2002) (interpreting Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969); 15 U.S.c. § 1334(b) (2000) ("No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and
health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes
the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.").
2J7 Walsh et al., supra note 34 at 874, n.203; Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and
Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193 (1994).
278 W Kip Viscusi, Steven R. Rowland, Howard L. Dorfman, Charles 1. Walsh, Deterring Inelfi.cient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economie RationaleJor the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense,
24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1437, 1468 (1994).
279 Id.
280 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
281 Underwarning can also present a problem. The need to find and maintain a balance in warning
sometimes leads FDA to initially approve labels that it later determines are inadequate, as is demonstrated
in the recent FDA rule that will require stronger warnings on products containing acetaminophen (which
can cause liver damages) and ibuprofen (which can cause gastrointestinal bleeding). See Stephanie Saul,
Warnings ProposedJor Over-the-Counter Drugs, N.Y TIMES, (Dec. 20, 2006) at AI8 ("The proposed
warnings-about possible liver failure from acetaminophen and gastrointestinal bleeding from other
medicines like aspirin, ibuprofen, naproxen and ketoprofen-follow alarms about overusing such
medications.").
282 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004).
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of the risk of suicide. 283 Pfizer was sued by the wife of a man who had committed
suicide shortly after he began taking Zoloft for depression. The Motus court upheld
the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant based on causation
and never reached the preemption argument. 284 But FDA's preemption brief has
nevertheless garnered a lot of attention as a clear statement of a policy change by
FDA about the preemptive effect of its prescription drug regulations. 285
The main argument in the "Motus brief" is summed up in the fol1owing excerpt
from the brief:
FDA, the federal agency charged with regulating the manufacture, sale,
and labeling of prescription drug products, has a clear interest to ensure
that state tort law does not undermine the agency's authority to protect
the public health through enforcement of the FDCA's prohibition against
false or misleading labeling of drug products. To require a warning of a
supposed danger that FDA concludes has no actual scientific basis, no
matter the warning's language, would be to require a statement that would
be false or misleading, and thus contrary to federallaw. 286
Notably, this statement incorporates the Supreme Court's position that, for the
purposes of preemption, tort liability for failure to warn is the functional equivalent
of state regulation. 287 FDA considers it so unlikely that a drug company would
not change its label after losing a lawsuit based on failure to warn and decide
instead to take its chances with future juries, that FDA simply equates one loss
in a lawsuit to a state-imposed labeling requirement. Regardless, FDA's reasoning is fairly simple: because it is responsible for determining both what should be
included on a prescription drug label and what constitutes misbranding,288 FDA's
determination of what should be included on a prescription drug label means that
anything else on that label would be misbrandingper se. These determinations are
an integral part of FDA's other main task, which is to determine which drugs are
safe and effective. 289 In the case of Zoloft, FDA had weighed the evidence of a link
283 Because of the learned intermediary rule, the plaintiffs alleged that the warning about suicide
should have been made to the prescribing physician, not to the patient. See Motus, 358 F3d at 660.
284 Motus, 358 F3d at 661. The Eastern District of Texas, however, did reach the preemption issue
in Cartwright v. Pfizer, and found no preemption based on state law about prescription drug warnings.
369 FSupp.2d 876, 881 (E.D.Tex. 2005).
285 This attempt is part of a larger strategy of the administration of George W Bush to use the
preemption doctrine to prevent consumers from suing drug manufacturers for product defects. See
Jonathan V ü'Steen, The FDA Defense: VIOXX and the Argument Against Federal Preemption of State
daims for Injuries Resultingfrom Defective Drugs, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 77 (2006) ("The Bush Administration contends that lawsuits encourage drug manufacturers to withdraw beneficial medications from
the market or provide warnings that overemphasize risks, to the detriment of patients"); Robert Pear,
ln a Shift, Bush Maves ta Black Medical Suits, N.Y TIMES, (July 25, 2004), at Al; Gary Young, FDA
Strategy Would Pre-Empt Tort Suits. Does ft Close Off Vital Drug Data? NAT'L L. 1., (Mar. 1,2004) at 1
("Under the Bush administration, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has adopted a novel
legal strategy that would, if successful, leave many consumers claiming injury from pharmaceuticals or
medical devices with no recourse to tort law, critics and attorneys charge. That strategy is pre-emption,
basically the nullification of state actions that conflict with or supplement FDA decisions. ").
286 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellee at 1-2, Motus
v. Pfizer Inc., 358 F3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 02-55372, 02-55498), 2002 WL 32303084 (footnotes
omitted).
287 See Epstein, supra note 254 at 26; Sharkey, supra note 207 at 23, n.98.
288 See 21 U.S.c. 331(a), (b) & (k) (2000).
289 Brief for the United States, supra note 286 at 4-5. See also supra note 203 and accompanying
text discussing Rabin's point that regardless of one's view of preemption or regulatory compliance,
FDA's approval process for drug labels is not aimed at minimal safety.
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between the drug and increased risk of suicide and decided that there was no causal
connection,290 so to warn of one would amount to placing false information on a
labe1. 291 FDA characterized this as classic "conflict" preemption because permitting tort liability would require the drug company to choose between following
state or federallaw. 292
In January 2006, FDA revised its regulations concerning the labeling of prescription drugs, as discussed above. 293 In the Preamble to this rulemaking, FDA stated
that its prescription drug labeling regulations preempted state law and state tort
liability related to prescription drug labeling on the grounds of conflict preemption. 294 The Preamble stated:
FDA believes that under existing preemption principles, FDA approval of
labeling under the act, whether it be in the old or new format, preempts
conflicting or contrary State law ....295
FDA offered two overarching reasons for this blanket preemption. The first is
the "expertise" rationale, and the second is the "repose" rationale. The expertise
rational is essentially that FDA is the congressionally designated expert on the
health and safety aspects of prescription drugs. 296 It engages in a rigorous process
of review when approving new drugs and it carefully weighs risks and benefits when
approving drug labeling and so should not be second-guessed by local juries who
have none of that expertise. Thus, the 2006 final proposed rule states:
Under the act, FDA is the expert Federal public health agency charged
by Congress with ensuring that drugs are safe and effective, and that their
labeling adequately informs users of the risks and benefits of the product
and is truthful and not misleading. Under the act and FDA regulations,
the agency makes approval decisions based not on an abstract estimation
of its safety and effectiveness, but rather on a comprehensive scientific
evaluation of the product's risks and benefits under the conditions of use
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling. 297
To support this, FDA provides a detailed explanation of the rigorous scientific
process that it employs before approving prescription drugs and their labeling. The
expertise rationale has been endorsed by scholars who consider tort liability to be
wasteful interference with this system. Richard Epstein, for example, argues that
the Preamble notwithstanding, the negative social and economic consequences of
permitting state tort liability for inadequate warnings when those warnings comply
with FDA requirements should lead courts to have a presumption in favor, rather
Brief for the United States, supra note 286 at 2-3.
Despite this position in Motus, FDA has since placed warnings about suicide by children on
SSRI's and recently held hearings to determine if it should expand those warnings to inc1ude adults.
Benedict Carey, Panel ta Weigh Expansion of Antidepressant Warnings, N. y. TIMES, (Dec. 13, 2006) at
A30.
292 Brief for the United States, supra note 286 at 15.
293 See discussion supra note 224 and accompanying text.
294 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological
Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3967 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 CFR pts. 201, 314, 601).
295 Id. at 3922.
296 Id. at 3934
290

291

297

Id.
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than against preemption. 298 The most serious of these consequences include the
stifling of innovation and delay in bringing much needed drugs to market. 299 This
is an endorsement of the expert theory because it implies that FDA is doing aIl that
needs to be done to protect the public in the context of prescription drugs. 300
The repose rationale focuses not on the expertise of FDA but on the position of
physicians and drug companies. It is essentially the argument that these actors are
put in an impossible bind by the allowance of state damages awards for inadequate
labeling on prescription drugs because they can never know what constitutes adequate labeling. As FDA stated:
If State authorities, including judges and juries applying State law, were
permitted to reach conclusions about the safety and effectiveness of information disseminated with respect to drugs for which FDA has aIready
made a series of regulatory determinations based on its considerable
institutional expertise and comprehensive statutory authority, the federal
system for regulation of drugs would be disrupted 301
This argument partakes of the regulatory compliance defense, i.e., that compliance with federal regulations ought to provide an affirmative defense to failure to
warn claims, as weIl as the expertise defense insofar as compliance should be enough
because FDA exercises its expertise so thoroughly in vetting prescription drug labels.
But, as Rabin points out, the goal of state tort liability may not be solely to create
incentives for drug manufacturers to make their products safer. They may consider
the compensatory and cost-spreading advantages of liability to be equally valuable goals. 302 lf that is the case, then there is no inherent inconsistency in awarding
damages against a drug company for failure to warn of known risks even though
the company complied with aIl applicable labeling requirements.
On its own, the repose rationale is both circular and proves too much. Defendants
are only entitled to repose if they are led to believe that they will achieve it merely
through regulatory compliance, and up until relatively recently, they had no reason
for believing this in the prescription drug labeling context, as discussed above. It
proves too much because it could be used in every federal regulatory context and
would therefore lead to automatic preemption whenever federal regulation is present and the defendant has complied with it.
FDA's attempt to establish preemption by regulatory fiat, or what Sharkey has
dubbed, "preemption by preamble,"303 has gotten a mixed reception by the courts
that have thus far addressed it. ln the past, courts have given credence to agency
declarations about the non-preemptive effect of their regulations,304 so it would be
consistent to pay attention to the agency's pro-preemption stance. 30S

Epstein, supra note 254 at 2-3.
Id. at 4.
](Hl Epstein does not, however, endorse Chevron deference as the rationale for preemption because
he does not believe that agency statements about preemption should be given weight. Id. at 15-16.
301 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological
Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3969.
298

299

302
303

304
305

Id.

Sharkey, supra note 207 at 1-3.
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495-496 (1996).
Epstein, supra note 254 at 30-31.
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A few cases have addressed the 2006 FDA Preamble. ln Abramowitz v. Cephalon,
/nc. ,306 the New Jersey Superior Court applied the learned intermediary rule to a
case involving the warnings on a prescription cancer drug, finding that the drug
company had given the physician adequate warnings, but stated in dicta that even
if the learned intermediary rule did not apply, the plaintiff's claim would have been
preempted and cited the 2006 Preamble to support this proposition. 30 7 A similar
conclusion was recently reached by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 30s
Other courts, however, have been less receptive to the preemptive effect of FDA's
Preamble. ln Perry v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp. ,309 a more recent case from
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the court rejected Chevron deference when
FDA was not creating or interpreting the substantive meaning of its regulations
but rather "supply[ing], on Congress' behalf, the clear legislative statement of intent
required to overcome the presumption against preemption. "310 The court gave no
credence to the statements in the Preamble and went on to find that the plaintiffs'
failure-to-warn claim was not preempted because FDA had not made a specifie
determination that the warning about the risk of cancer from Elidel, a drug for
atopic dermatitis, was not warranted, even though it had approved labeling that
did not contain that warning. 311 Another court addressing the same Preamble in
litigation over the same drug treated the Preamble to Skidmore deference, which
holds that the agency's interpretations are "entitled to respect" only to the extent
that they have the "power to persuade. "312 Both the Weiss and the Perry courts, along
with several others, held that the Preamble was an advisory opinion, not subject to
notice and comment, and therefore not subject to Chevron deference. 313
There are two important implications of FDA's new position on preemption of
drug labeling requirements when considering the labeling of samples. First, it is
still unclear whether FDA's Preamble will be adopted by the courts, particularly the
Supreme Court. The Preamble has generated a lot of controversy and its merits are
being actively debated in the courts and law reviews. 314 Second, and more significantly, even if the Supreme Court eventually accepts FDA's arguments for preemption of state tort liability for failure to warn of risks from prescription drugs, there
are very good reasons why the labeling of samples should not be preempted.
FDA's justification for its preemption doctrine for labeling, as articulated in the
January 2006 Preamble and the Motus brief is focused on the content of the label,
the problem of misbranding, and the fear that state liability rules about the content
J06

Abramowitz v. Cephalon, Inc., No. BER-I-617-04, 2006 WL 560639 (N.l Super. Ct. Mar. 3,

2006).
Id. at *3. See also, Sharkey, supra note 207 at 13-18.
See Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
309 456 F. Supp. 2d 678 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
JIO Id. at 864 (internai quotations omitted).
JII Id. at 685. It was based on the issue of the specificity of FDA's findings as to that particular
risk that distinguished this case from Colacicco. In Colacicco, FDA had specifical1y determined that
there was no link between the SSRI and risk of suicide and therefore did not require it be placed on
the label.
JI' Weiss v. Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., 464 F. Supp. 2d 666, 673 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (quoting
Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134,140 (1944».
313 Id. Advisory opinions are defined as "[a]ny portion of a Federal Register notice other than the
text of a proposed or final regulation." 21 CFR § 1O.85(d)(I) (2006). See also Jackson v. Pfizer, 432
F. Supp. 2d 964 (D. Neb. 2006) and In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation, 489 FSupp.2d 230
(E.D.NY 2007).
JI' See general/y, Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 FSupp.2d 514 (E.D.Pa. 2006); Perry, 456 FSupp.2d
678; Weiss, 464 F Supp. 666; Jackson, 432 FSupp.2d 964; Epstein supra note 254; Sharkey, supra note
207; Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 64.
307

JOH
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of labels can create a situation where juries act out of sympathy for plaintiffs rather
than out of a true understanding of the complex risk benefit analysis that goes into
labeling decisions. The labeling of samples does not present a situation in which FDA
has considered and then rejected this type of labeling based on scientific information. 315 The issue of whether drug companies should be vulnerable to state tort liability
for failing to use a version of the FDA-approved warning, translated into language
understandable to the patient, does not involve the question of the adequacy of the
content of the warning and the risks and benefits of alternative warnings. 316 There
is no health risk involved in adding a patient warning to a drug that is otherwise
essentially unlabeled and there is no evidence that astate which imposed such a requirement through liability rules would interfere with the central risk-benefit function
of FDA. In response to a query by the judge in Perry, FDA took the position that
state tort law is preempted if it imposes liability for a company's failure to provide a
warning that FDA has rejected, or would reject, as scientifically unsubstantiated, or
for a company's conduct in providing a warning that FDA deems necessary for the
safe and efficacious use of a prescription drug. 317
The case of samples would even pass Epstein's blanket endorsement of preemption that does not rely on FDA statements. For Epstein, preemption of state tort
liability is appropriate whenever the courts answer the following two questions in
the affirmative:
First, are these cases in which there are alternative hazards associated with
possible courses of action; second, did the agency make a considered examination of the various risks when it decided on its course of action?318
There is no public safety issue involved in astate creating incentives for drug
companies to provide warnings on their sample packages. The problem of overwarning is belied by the fact that sorne companies already provide patient warnings with
samples. 319 There is also no evidence in FDA regulations that the decision not to
require warnings on sample prescription drugs was the result of an examination of
the risks involved in providing warnings. Allowing patients to sue drug companies
directly for failing to warn about risks associated with prescription drug samples
would not conflict with any federal interest that is promoted by prescription drug
regulation.

v. PRUDENTIAL OBJECTIONS
There are also prudential objections to creating an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine for prescription drug samples. The substance of these objections
depends on how one thinks drug companies would react to the type of liability
exposure suggested in this Article. If one believes, for example, that recognition of
an exception to the learned intermediary rule for drug samples would lead drug
315 Brief for United States, supra note 286; Robert B. Leflar & Robert S. Adler, The Preemption
Pentad: Federal Preemption of Products Liability Claims A{ter Medtronic, 63 TENN. L. REV. 691, 717
(1997).
316 Drug companies have a lot of experience with these patient package inserts because FDA
requiTes them in sorne contexts. See supra, notes 234-239 and accompanying text.
317 Weiss, 464 F.Supp.2d at 672 (quoting Letter ta Judge Dalzell at 2, Perry v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., No. 05-5350 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2006)).
318 Epstein, supra note 254 at 20.
319 See supra notes 277-291 and accompanying text.

Poser in Food and Drug Law Journal (2007) 62(4).
Copyright 2007, Food and Drug Law Institute. Used by permission.

690

FOOD AND DRUG LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 62

companies to put labels on all individual samples, then one might object to this
proposaI based on the cost and waste associated with labeling every sample or
blister pack.
On the other hand, if one predicted that drug companies would instead stop
using samples as a promotional tool, then one might object because of the benetits of contact between physicians and drug reps, and because the elimination of
samples would hurt the poor who are often the beneficiaries of these free drugs. It
is also possible that drug companies would undertake sorne combination of these
approaches, or do nothing at all and take their risks with the liability system. Each
of these objections will be briefly addressed.
It is feasible to attach labels to individual samples, and proponents of patient
labeling on sampIe drugs have proposed labeling that would work with small packages. These inc1ude "bifold or trifold packaging design in which the product storage
compartment is built directly in to the outside labeling."32o Many sample drugs are
already individually boxed and contain patient information. 321 There is already so
much waste involved in the packaging and promotion of samples that drug companies might come out even by simply shifting their information from promotional
language on the outside of the packaging to patient information on the inside. 322
Or they might simply give away fewer meals, pens and notepads. There is, in short,
so much money invested in drug promotion that patient labeling on samples could
easily be accomplished through a shift, rather than increase, in resources.
There is also a general impression that sample prescription drugs benefit the poor
because they allow physicians to give away free medicine. 323 If drug companies react
to liability exposure for distributing unlabeled samples by no longer distributing
them, this could eliminate this source of free drugs. But it is not c1ear that giving free
samples to private physicians has much of an effect on the poor. 324 As one scholar
put it, "[P]roviding samples is marketing, pure and simple."325 If the physician is
able to provide full treatment with the samples, sorne saving in individual cases will
be realized, but if it is just a trial run for an expensive drug, then the samples may
result in higher drug costs overall for individuals. 326 Moreover, people who rely on
charity for their prescription drugs might be more in need of written instructions
and warnings because they are less likely to get the time and attention from their
physicians than other patients. If drug companies want to donate prescription drugs
to charity, there are many ways to do it, inc1uding vouchers that can be taken to
a pharmacy. 327
J20 Dili & Generali, supra note 190 at 2090. See also, Medscape.com, Ask The Experts-Is it Legal
to Use Samples to Supply a Patient with Medication? http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/4l3404 (last
visited Feb. 20, 2007). There is a website created by a physician that is entirely devoted to eliminating
drug promotion. It also has suggestions for effective labeling of samples, see http://www.nofreelunch.
org.
J2l Dili & Generali, supra note 190 at 2087.
J22 Manjunath P. Pai, Danielle M. Graci, & Joseph S. Bertino, Waste Generation of Drug Product
Samples Versus Prescriptions Obtained Through Pharmacy Dispensing, 20 PHARMACOTHERAPY 593,
594--595 (2000) (reporting that the packaging of samples creates 5X as much waste as that of drugs
dispensed from the pharmacy).; Dili & Generali, supra note 190 at 2090; Martin T. Donohoe, Letter to
the Editor, Wasted Paper in Pharmaceutical Samples, 340 NEW ENG. 1. MED 1600 (1999).
J23 Sec e.g. WEBER, supra note 128 at 85.
324 Harris, supra note 27.
325 WEBER, supra note 129 at 85.
326 Id; Coyle, supra note 148 at 398.
J27 Saul Weiner, Jill Dischler, & Cheryl Horvitz, Beyond Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Assistance:
Broadening the Scope of an Indigent Drug Program, 58 AM. 1. HEALTH-SYST. PHARMAClSTS 146, 149
(2001).

Poser in Food and Drug Law Journal (2007) 62(4).
Copyright 2007, Food and Drug Law Institute. Used by permission.

2007

UNLABELED DRUG SAMPLES AND THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY

691

Moreover, there are sorne beneficial collateral effects that might result from the
liability rule proposed herein. First, if drug companies were to respond to recognition of an exception to the learned intermediary rule by decreasing their distribution of samples, it might lower drug costs. The notion that samples effectively
counteract the high cost of prescription drugs because they are freebies has been
refuted by studies showing that any savings by individuals receiving free drugs are
more than compensated for by the fact that the use of samples tends to lead physicians to prescribe newer more expensive drugs. 328 In fact, institutions that have
banned samples have found that drug costs decrease thereafter. 329 The high cost of
prescription drugs is in part due to the marketing budget of the pharmaceutical
industry, which in the year 2000 was $13.2 billion for advertising and promotions
to physicians, which accounted for Il.8 percent of the pharmaceutical industry's
revenue from sales. 330 One commentatar dubbed these gifts a "surreptitious transfer
of wealth from patients to doctors."331
There are sorne benefits to physician interaction with the representatives of drug
companies. Physicians are busy and it is convenient for them that someone will come
to their office to tell them about the latest drugs and give them free samples. 332 This
might be compromised if, in reaction ta liability exposure, drug companies cut down
on their promotional activities. 333 But, as discussed above, a significant portion of
the information that drug reps convey is misleading if not simply wrong. A recent
article in the American Journal of Bioethics concluded:
Industry proponents assert that because physician-detailer interaction
raises awareness of new products, the practice benefits patients. However,
no evidence exists to support this claim. In contrast, research suggests
that physicians rely heavily on detailers for information and that the more
doctors rely on commercial sources of information, the less likely they
are to prescribe drugs in a manner consistent with patient needs. Information provided by detailers is often biased, and sometimes dangerously
misleading. 334
Not only is this information misleading, but physicians are often misled, relying
on the messages imparted by drug reps, even when it differs from information from
scientific sources that are available to physicians. 335 Partly in reaction to the perceived quid pro quo of drug rep education, a practice called "academic detailing" is
gaining momentum. Academic detailing involves healthcare organizations sending
physicians and pharmacists to the offices of private physicians in the community
328 Wilson, supra note 137. ("many medical directors blame the sales tactics of drug reps for influencing physicians to prescribe new, expensive drugs over less expensive equally effective products.");
Meadows, supra note 137 at 18; WEBER, supra note 129 at 84.
329 Harris, supra note 27.
330 Winston Chiong, Industry-to-Physician Marketing and the Cost of Prescription Drugs, 3 AM.
1. B10ETHICS 28, 28 (2003).
3JI

Id.

Blumenthal, supra note 94 at 1887,1889. In addition to being convenient, it may also be a sign
of respect and professional recognition, particularly to new doctors. Katz et al., supra note 120 at 40.
333 Many physicians are only willing to see drug reps because they want the samples. Darves, supra
note 182.
J34 Katz et al., supra note 120 at 40.
335 Stephen B. Soumeral & Jerry Avorn, Principles of Education Outreach ('Academie Detailing')
to Improve Clinical Decision Making 283 JAMA 549,550 (1990). This is so even though having a background in science is not required for a drug rep and is often completely lacking. Id. at 554.
3J2
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to educate them about new drugs and practices. 336 Using sorne of the techniques
of behavioral science that drug reps use, but without the financial incentives of
gifts and samples, academic detailers provide prescription drug information and
prescribing suggestions to physicians. The goal of academic detailing is to counteract the influence of drug reps, improve clinical decision making by physicians,
and respond to pressure to minimize healthcare costs. 337 Because "no current
regulatory apparatus can ensure that marketed drugs are prescribed intelligently,"338
it is possible that a decrease in contact between drug reps and physicians would
lead to more time and attention given to academic detailers, which would improve
physician education. 339

VI.

CONCLUSION

Tort rules are rules of policy and there are many good policy reasons for creating
this new exception to the learned intermediary rule. The risk created by drug companies through their promotional practices is borne by patients who receive these
drugs from physicians in whom drug companies have attempted to instill bias. The
unsuspecting patients do not in turn subject any of those parties to risks in return.
The risk created by drug companies in their promotion and distribution of samples
is thus nonreciprocal insofar as the drug companies incur no risk to themselves in
creating risk to others. 34û In fact, effective marketing of pharmaceutical products
is enabled by the trusting relationship in which the ultimate consumer, the patient,
receives the drug. The patient is likely unaware that the sample was provided to the
physician by a drug rep who considers himself or herself a participant in the market,
where caveat emptor is the guiding principle. 341 The liability shield provided by the
learned intermediary rule creates incentives for drug companies to pour money
into promoting the newest and most expensive drugs to physicians with impunity,
which in turn contributes to the growing cost of prescription drugs.
Permitting a cause of action on behalf of patients against drug companies for failure to warn on sample medication would begin to address this imbalance by requiring
drug companies to absorb sorne of the cost of the risk that their conduct creates. This
proposaI in no way suggests relieving physicians of their independent dutYto warn,
and physicians who permit themselves to be influenced in their prescribing practices
or fail to warn patients about the risks of sample drugs they distribute could still be
subject to liability for failure to provide this information. This proposaI only suggests
that liability for the risk to patients who are not fully informed about the sample drugs
they are given accurately track responsibility for creation of that risk, which requires
it be shared by drug manufacturers and physicians alike. In a case like Vitanza with
which this article began, accurately tracking responsibility might also require that
the doctrine of comparative negligence be applied. A jury might find it reasonable
Id. The author is indebted to Professor Bob Works for bringing this to the author's attention.
Id. at 555-556.
J38 Id.
339 Studies have found that physicians react positively to academic detailing and report finding it
helpful. See, e.g., Helene Levens Lipton, Jonathan D. Agnew, Marilyn R. Stebbins & R. Adams Dudley,
Managing the Unmanageable: The Nature and Impact of Drug Risk in Physician Groups, 301. HEALTH
POL. POL'Y & L. 719, 731 (2005); AVORN, supra note 96 at 325-326.
340 See general/y, Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48
STAN. L. REV. 311 (1996); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537
(1972).
341 See WEBER, supra note 129 at 96-97 (arguing that caveat emptor should be replaced with a standard of "due care" in marketing pharmaceuticals because of the their importance to human health).
336
337
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to apportion sorne responsibility to a victim like Mr. Vitanza, who knowingly took
a sample drug that was not dispensed to him. 342
Recognition of an exception to the learned intermediary rule for prescription
drug samples would be a salutary use of tort law to affect the conduct of an entire
industry in a context where the legislative process has failed because of powerful
interests in opposition. 343 As in the case of tobacco, this is an instance in which
tort law can serve the important function of uncovering and alerting the public
to "unscrupulous and socially dangerous business practices detrimental to the
public health. "344 Also like the tobacco situation, permitting plaintiffs to sue
drug manufacturer's directly for their failure to label prescription drug samples
adequately is likely to uncover business conduct that is dangerous to public health
and safety in a context where legislative or regulatory solutions are improbable
because of the power and influence of corporate interests, in this case, the drug
lobby.345 As Senator Charles E. Grassley recently lamented, FDA "was far too
'cozy' with drug makers."346 If true, this cozy relationship may be due in part to
the fact that more than 25 percent of FDA's budget cornes from fees collected
from drug makers. These fees, negotiated with the drug companies, include the
proviso that FDA would not spend much of it on tracking drugs after they are
approved and put on the market. 347 This is a classic case of capture in which a
federal agency, although charged with regulatory oversight of an industry, is the
one arm of government least capable of carrying out that charge. 348 The power of
the pharmaceutical industry is also felt at the state level. Sorne state legislatures
have tried to reign in drug promotion by passing laws requiring pharmaceutical
companies to disclose the gifts that they make. Vermont, West Virginia, Maine
and Minnesota have such laws. 349 New York recently failed to pass such a law
because of the lobbying by PhRMA, the lobbying group for brand-name drug
companies. 350
Exposure to this type of liability would force pharmaceutical companies to
consider the risks to the public that they are creating through their promotional
activities, something that they do not have to consider under current law because
of the learned intermediary rule. They would have to determine whether it was
economically beneficial to put labels on aIl samples of prescription drugs, or only
on those with particularly severe side effects or to which a significant portion of
the general population might be allergic, and then suffer the liability consequences
of those decisions. 351 Other industries whose products or conduct pose direct risks
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to the public are required to do this calculation. The pharmaceutical industry's
aggressive marketing of unlabeled sample prescription drugs creates a potentially
lethal situation for patients. In this context, the learned intermediary rule creates
incentives for drug companies that are incompatible with public health.

